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COMMUNITIES AND THE CALIFORNIA
COMMISSION
Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos*
INTRODUCTION
In most respects, the redistricting initiatives that California's voters ap-
proved in 2008 and 2010 were standard good-government fare.1 As reformers
had long advocated, the measures withdrew the power of drawing district lines
from the State Legislature, and entrusted it to a new Citizens Redistricting
Commission.2 Also consistent with many earlier proposals, the measures set
forth a specific set of criteria pursuant to which districts subsequently would be
drawn. These criteria unsurprisingly included equal population, compliance
with the Voting Rights Act, contiguity, compactness, and respect for 3political
subdivisions (such as towns and counties) and communities of interest.
What was unusual about the California initiatives was that they explicitly
ranked these criteria-and, even more so, that they ranked subdivision and
community preservation so high. After two provisions that duplicate existing
Associate-in-Law, Postdoctoral Research Scholar, and Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia
Law School. My thanks to Bruce Cain, Heather Gerken, Bernie Grofman, Michael Kang,
Vladimir Kogan, Todd Makse, Eric McGhee, and Nate Persily, as well as the participants in
the Redistricting in the 2010s symposium, for all of their helpful comments.
1. See TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 11, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION
VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 137-40 (2008), available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/
2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#prop11; TEXT OF PROPOSED
LAWS: PROPOSITION 20, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 95-99
(2010), available at http://cdn.sos.ca.gov/vig20l0/general/pdf/english/text-proposed-laws
.pdf. Proposition 11 applied to state legislative redistricting, while Proposition 20 applied to
congressional redistricting.
2. The Commission is carefully designed to be insulated from political influence. Its
fourteen members are selected from the public at large through an elaborate procedure ad-
ministered by the State Auditor. See TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 11, supra note
1.
3. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d).
281
HeinOnline  -- 23 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 281 2012
STANFORD LAW & POLICYREVIEW
federal obligations,4 as well as the relatively trivial requirement of contiguity, 5
the next most important criterion is that "[t]he geographic integrity of any city,
county .. . local neighborhood, or local community of interest shall be respect-
ed in a manner that minimizes [its] division." 6 While many states have similar
requirements on their books,7 the California Constitution is unique in the pre-
mium that it now places on subdivision and community preservation. It is
unique in clearly prioritizing this criterion-aimed at making districts more co-
herent and thus improving voter participation and the quality of representa-
tion-over values such as compactness, competition, and partisan fairness.8
Since the Commission finalized its inaugural set of district plans in August
2011, scholars have analyzed its performance along multiple dimensions. They
have found, among other things, that the Commission-crafted districts are more
compact, split fewer towns and counties, provide greater representation to mi-
nority groups, and are more competitive than their legislatively drawn prede-
cessors.9 However, there has been no effort to date to determine how congruent
the Commission's districts are with communities of interest (as opposed to po-
litical subdivisions). As the authors of one study candidly admit, "Because it is
difficult to establish a systematic definition of a community of interest, we do
not attempt to evaluate the plans on that dimension."10 Nor, for the same rea-
son, do there exist earlier studies appraising any other states' efforts to comply
with community preservation requirements. I
In this Article, then, I aim to assess quantitatively how closely the old and
new California districts correspond to geographic communities of interest. I do
4. See id. § 2(d)(l)-(2) (requiring district equipopulation and compliance with the
Voting Rights Act).
5. See id. § 2(d)(3).
6. Id. § 2(d)(4).
7. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REDISTRICTING LAw 2010, at
125-27 (2009) [hereinafter NCSL REPORT] (forty-four states have subdivision preservation
requirements and twenty-one have community preservation requirements).
8. See Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 8) (on file with author) ("[T]he geographic
community of interest (GCOI) criterion was given much more emphasis [in the California
initiatives] than in the past.").
9. See Vladimir Kogan & Eric McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of
the Citizens Commission Final Plans (Sept. 13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); see also Cain, supra note 8.
10. Kogan & McGhee, supra note 9, at 15; see also BRUCE E. CAIN ET AL.,
COMPETITION AND REDISTRICTING IN CALIFORNIA: LESSONS FOR REFORM 3 (2006) ("[W]e did
not use the Community of Interest criterion in our exercise because it is difficult to impossi-
ble to implement without public testimony.").
11. Two studies that sought to draw districts based on quantitative evidence about the
location of communities of interest are MAPPING COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST: THE REVISED
PLAINTIFFS' SENATE PLAN (2001) (on file with author), and Todd Makse, Defining "Commu-
nities of Interest" in Redistricting Through Initiative Voting (July 5, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). However, neither of these studies attempted to assess how
closely individual districts correspond to geographic communities.
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so using a concept, "spatial diversity," that I introduced in a previous work of
mine. 12 Spatial diversity refers to the heterogeneity of a larger entity's geo-
graphic subunits with respect to some variable of interest. For example, an enti-
ty is spatially diverse, in terms of income, if some of its subunits are rich, some
are middle-class, and some are poor. But the entity is spatially homogeneous if
most of its subunits feature the same income profile (whatever that may be).
The connection between spatial diversity and the community-of-interest criteri-
on is that highly spatially diverse districts tend to combine different geographic
communities, while districts that are highly spatially uniform tend to coincide
with a single community.
I employ two different kinds of data in my analysis. First, as in my earlier
work, I rely on a wide array of demographic and socioeconomic information
from the American Community Survey (ACS), covering vital areas such as
race, ethnicity, age, income, education, profession, marital status, and housing.
Second, I take advantage of California's frequent popular initiatives (PI), which
enable voters to voice their policy preferences on a host of important issues:
taxes, spending, crime, abortion, energy, the environment, government reform,
etc. For both sets of data, I use a technique known as factor analysis to collapse
the raw variables into a much smaller number of composite factors. These fac-
tors capture much of the data's original variance and reveal which raw varia-
bles, in which combinations, best explain California's residential patterns. The
factors are also the inputs for all of my spatial diversity calculations.
The Article's principal finding is that, by a variety of metrics, California's
new assembly, senate, and congressional districts are more congruent with geo-
graphic communities of interest than their predecessors. Their average levels of
spatial diversity are lower, with respect to both the ACS and PI factors. There
are fewer districts with extremely high spatial diversity scores, particularly in
terms of the ACS factors. And at the congressional level and in terms of the
ACS factors (for which interstate comparisons are possible), California's new
districts rank nineteenth in the country in adjusted spatial diversity instead of
fifth. This is persuasive evidence that the Commission indeed complied with its
mandate to respect the integrity of geographic communities. But there is also
reason to think that the Commission could have done an even better job, espe-
cially vis-A-vis the assembly plan and the PI factors.
The Article complements these results with a series of vignettes that identi-
fy both areas where the Commission was able to raise dramatically the level of
district-community congruence, and areas where it seems to have fallen short.
For example, one existing congressional district combines gritty portions of the
San Fernando Valley with affluent locales such as Beverly Park and Sherman
Oaks. This district's more spatially homogeneous successor, in contrast, retains
its Valley core but then swells to the north, east, and west instead of veering
12. See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1903
(2012).
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south into Los Angeles's tonier precincts. On the other hand, the compact Afri-
can-American community in South L.A. is divided between three districts un-
der both the old and new congressional plans. The Commission appears to have
missed an opportunity to create a spatially homogeneous district congruent with
this minority community.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes California's history with
the community-of-interest criterion (which long predates the 2008 and 2010
initiatives). Part II explains the methodology that I use to analyze how closely
districts correspond to geographic communities. Finally, Part III presents my
key empirical findings-both for the state as a whole and for particular regions.
I. THE COMMUNITY-OF-INTEREST CRITERION
The requirement that districts coincide with geographic communities of in-
terest did not materialize out of thin air in California's 2008 and 2010 redis-
tricting initiatives. To the contrary, the criterion has a rich history, in both case
law and earlier initiatives, stretching back almost forty years. In this Part, I
briefly summarize this history, which is essential for understanding how dis-
trict-community congruence came to achieve such prominence in California's
current district-drawing process.
In the 1970s round of redistricting, the first after the one person, one vote
revolution of the 1960s, California's Democratic-controlled Legislature was
unable to agree on district plans with Republican Governor Ronald Reagan.13
The California Supreme Court therefore was forced to intervene, appointing
three Special Masters to devise plans for the Assembly, the Senate, and the
state's congressional delegation. 14 In the report that accompanied their plans,
the Masters described in detail the criteria that they employed. One of the most
important of these criteria was respect for communities of interest:
The social and economic interests common to the population of an area which
are probable subjects of legislative action, generally termed a "community of
interests," should be considered in determining whether the area should be in-
cluded within or excluded from a proposed district in order that all of the citi-
zens of the district might be represented reasonably, fairly and effectively. Ex-
amples of such interests, among others, are those common to an urban area, a
rural area, an industrial area or an agricultural area, and those common to are-
as in which the people share similar living standards, use the same transporta-
tion facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access to the same me-
dia of communication relevant to the election process.15
13. See Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal. 3d 396, 399-400 (1973); J. Morgan Kousser,
Redistricting: California, 1971-2001, in GOVERNING CALIFORNIA: POLITICs, GOVERNMENT,
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE GOLDEN STATE 155, 157 (Gerald C. Lubenow ed., 2006).
14. See Reinecke, 10 Cal. 3d at 401.
15. Id. at 412 (internal citations omitted).
284 [Vol. 23:2
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In its 1973 decision upholding the Masters' plans, the California Supreme
Court lauded their "over-all reasonableness and excellence."l 6 The Court also
noted that "there is broad agreement that the . . . criteria [used by the Masters]
are appropriate," and that "legislators and congressmen affected thereby, many
amici curiae, and others who have expressed themselves" all approved of the
plans.17 Scholars concurred that the Masters' districts were geographically
compact, fair to both major parties, responsive to changes in public opinion,
and conducive to minority representation.' 8 And California's voters embraced
several of the Masters' criteria (though not the community preservation re-
quirement) in a legislatively referred 1980 initiative.19
In contrast to this success story, California's redistricting experience in the
1980s was a debacle (except from the perspective of Democratic partisans). In
full control of the state government, Democrats managed to implement a set of
egregious gerrymanders-though only after their initial efforts were thwarted
by a popular referendum,20 and their subse uent plans spawned litigation that
made it to the United States Supreme Court. 1 So great was the public's dissat-
isfaction thatfive separate initiatives aimed at reforming the state's redistricting
process garnered enough signatures to make it onto the ballot.22 While none of
these measures became law, four would have compelled districts to respect the
boundaries of census tracts, cities, counties, and/or geographic regions.2
In the 1990s, California's elected branches deadlocked again, and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court once more stepped into the breach, appointing three new
Special Masters to formulate district plans. 24 These Masters employed the same
redistricting criteria as their 1970s forerunners-including precisely the same
definition of the communities of interest to which districts were required to cor-
16. Id. at 404.
17. Id. at 402, 404.
18. See Gordon E. Baker, Lessons from the 1973 California Masters' Plan, in
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 296, 301-08 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990);
Thomas Hofeller & Bernard Grofman, Comparing the Compactness of California Congres-
sional Districts Under Three Different Plans: 1980, 1982, and 1984, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra, at 281, 284-86; Kousser, supra note 13, at 157-
59; GEORGE PASSANTINO, REDISTRICTING IN CALIFORNIA: COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS AND THE
EFFECTS OF PROPOSITION 11, at 12-13 (2008).
19. See California Ballot Propositions, 1980-1989, L.A. LAW LIBRARY, http://www
.Ialawlibrary.org/research/ballots/1980/1980.aspx (last visited Feb. 29, 2012); see also CAL.
CONsT. art. XXI, § 1(e) (amended 2008) (requiring respect for "geographical integrity of any
city, county, or city and county, or of any geographical region").
20. See Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives
to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 360 (2007).
21. See Badham v. Eu, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989).
22. See ALAN HESLOP, REDISTRICTING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 1-5 (2003); Kousser,
supra note 13, at 161-64; Stephanopoulos, supra note 20, at 360-68.
23. See HESLOP, supra note 22, at 1-5.
24. See Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 547-48 (Cal. 1992).
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25
respond. The Masters also explained that the "values expressed in the concept
of . .. community of interest" include "the ability of citizens to relate to each
other and their representatives" and "the ability of representatives to relate ef-
fectively to their constituency."26 As in the 1970s, the California Supreme
Court effusively praised the Masters' "expertise in the art of reapportion-
ment,"27 and outside observers commended the plans for their "remarkable
number of competitive districts." 28
The new millennium brought with it another gerrymander, though this time
of the bipartisan variety. While Democrats controlled both the Legislature and
the Governorship in 2001, they feared igniting a 1980s-style firestorm if they
enacted plans designed to maximize their partisan advantage.29 They therefore
struck a deal with the Republicans that sought to protect incumbents of both
parties from any electoral threat. The result was a shockingly low level of com-
petition: in the 2004 election, for example, not a single assembly, senate, or
congressional seat changed hands. 30 Largely because of this political paralysis,
new Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger campaigned heavily on be-
half of a 2005 redistricting initiative. While it failed at the polls (like its 1980s
antecedents), it too would have barred the unnecessary splitting of cities and
counties. 31
The tide finally turned for reformers in 2008, when Proposition 11
squeaked through by less than two points.32 In addition to creating the Citizens
Redistricting Commission, the measure specified that respect for political sub-
divisions and communities of interest henceforth would be the most important
district-drawing criterion after equal population, compliance with the Voting
Rights Act, and geographic contiguity. 33 "The geographic integrity of any city,
county ... neighborhood, or community of interest shall be respected to the ex-
25. See id. at 573 (quoting Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal. 3d 396, 412 (1973)).
26. Id. at 574-75.
27. Id. at 559.
28. DOUGLAS JOHNSON, COMPETITIVE DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA: A CASE STUDY OF
CALIFORNIA'S REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990s, at7 (2005); see also PASSANTINO, supra note 18,
at 11-13. But see Kousser, supra note 13, at 166-67 (arguing that 1990s plans favored Re-
publicans).
29. See Kogan & McGhee, supra note 9, at 4.
30. See CAIN, supra note 10, at 12; JOHNSON, supra note 28, at 8; PASSANTINO, supra
note 18, at 11-13.
31. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 20, at 371-74.
32. See Votes for and Against November 4, 2008 State Ballot Measures, CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008 general/7 votesfor
against.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). For an analysis of why the measure prevailed, see
Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, A Fighting Chance for Redistricting, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2008, at A21, and Vladimir Kogan & Thad Kousser, Great Expectations and the California
Citizens Redistricting Commission (unpublished manuscript).
33. See TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 11, supra note 1.
286 [Vol. 23:2
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tent possible . . .. Communities of interest shall not include relationships with
political parties, incumbents, or political candidates." 34
Two years later, California's voters endorsed a second redistricting initia-
tive, Proposition 20, by more than twenty points. 35 This measure both added
congressional districts to the Commission's purview and revised Proposition
II's section on communities of interest. 36 The new definition read as follows:
The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighbor-
hood, or local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that mini-
mizes their division to the extent possible .... A community of interest is a
contiguous population which shares common social and economic interests
that should be included within a single district for purposes of its effective and
fair representation. Examples of such shared interests are those common to an
urban area, a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those
common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the
same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access
to the same media of communication relevant to the election process. Com-
munities of interest shall not include relationships with political parties, in-
cumbents, or political candidates.37
This language, of course, was drawn almost verbatim from the reports of
the 1970s and 1990s Special Masters. 38 In fact, the consensus that the Masters
had done quite a good job drawing California's districts-but that the elected
branches had performed poorly in the 1980s and 2000s-was precisely why
Proposition 20 copied the Masters' approach. As demographer Anthony Quinn
has noted, "The authors of Propositions 11 and 20 were well aware of the ...
Masters' criteria," and "incorporated the language used by the Masters . . . . [in
order] to prevent gerrymandering." 39
Accordingly, the California Constitution now boasts the country's most de-
tailed and most highly prioritized requirement of district-community congru-
ence-and, to boot, one that has been employed successfully in two prior dec-
ades. Under this provision, only geographic communities of interest, i.e.,
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. See Votes for and Against November 2, 2010 Statewide Ballot Measures,
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/20 1 0-general/07-for
-against.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
36. See TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 20, supra note 1.
37. Id. at 96.
38. See Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 573 (Cal. 1992); Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal.
3d 396, 412 (1973).
39. Declaration of Dr. T. Anthony Quinn, Ph.D. in Support of Petitioner for Writ of
Mandate or Writ of Prohibition §§ 6, 7, 9, Vandermost v. Bowen, 53 Cal. 4th 421 (2012)
(No. S198387); see also John Diaz, The Status Quo Strikes Back, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 19,
2010, at E2 (observing that Proposition 20's language "was drawn from the guidelines used
after the 1990 census," which "contributed to a record number of minorities . . . reaching the
Senate and Assembly").
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"contiguous population[s]," are relevant to the district-drawing process. 40 The
provision also defines communities in terms of "common social and economic
interests" rather than people's subjective affiliations with particular places.41
All of the provision's examples of communities ("an urban area, a rural area, an
industrial area, or an agricultural area," "areas in which the people share similar
living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work op-
portunities, or have access to the same media of communication") sound in an
objective key.42 Lastly, the provision's conception of communities is resolutely
apolitical. Constituents' "relationships with political parties, incumbents, or po-
litical candidates," no matter how meaningful, cannot be taken into account by
the Commission.43
The underlying rationale for California's community-of-interest criterion is
that important democratic values such as participation and representation argu-
ably are advanced when districts coincide with geographic communities. With
regard to participation, the theory is that voters are more politically informed
and engaged when the communities to which they belong are respected by dis-
trict lines, not broken apart or fused with dissimilar groups.44 In the words of
Proposition 11, "Voters in many communities have no political voice [when
they are] split into as many as four different districts."45 With respect to repre-
sentation, the claim is that elected officials are better able to identify and serve
their constituents' interests when districts correspond to communities. 46 As
both Propositions 11 and 20 put it, "We need reform to keep our communities
together so everyone has representation." 47
When it designed California's new districts in 2011, the Commission im-
plemented the community-of-interest criterion by soliciting, and then taking in-
to account, extensive input from concerned individuals and groups. It held doz-
ens of hearings across the state at which thousands of parties submitted oral and
40. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4) (emphasis added).
41. Id.; cf Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the Territorial Community,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379, 1430 (2012) (defining communities of interest in both objective and
subjective terms).
42. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4); see also STATE OF CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING
COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON 2011 REDISTRICTING 27 (2011) [hereinafter CRC REPORT] (refer-
ring to "industrial/economic interests that define communities").
43. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
44. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 1918-20 (discussing literature on participa-
tory consequences of spatial diversity); id at 1942-45 (finding that voter roll-off rate is high-
er in districts that are more spatially diverse).
45. TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 11, supra note 1.
46. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 1919-20 (discussing literature on represen-
tational consequences of spatial diversity); id. at 1945-47 (finding that politicians' voting
records in spatially diverse districts are less responsive to constituents' needs and interests).
47. TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 11, supra note 1; TEXT OF PROPOSED
LAWS: PROPOSITION 20, supra note 1.
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written comments. 4 8 It then employed a "district-by-district approach in which
[it] deliberated over the best [way] to minimize the splitting of . . . communities
of interest."A9 When the goals of subdivision and community preservation con-
flicted, "the Commission chose the configuration that best reflected the shared
interests of the community." 50 However, the Commission apparently did not
use demographic or socioeconomic data to identify community boundaries, nor
did it attempt to calculate how congruent its districts are with communities. 5 1
II. METHODOLOGY
Because of its complexity, very few scholars have attempted to operation-
alize the concept of a community of interest. In fact, I am not aware of any
studies that have sought to uantify how closely individual districts correspond
to geographic communities. 2 In this Part, I explain how I carried out precisely
this sort of quantification for California's old and new assembly, senate, and
congressional districts. 53 The key insight is that districts (like all geographic
entities) are composed of many smaller spatial subunits. If the subunits within a
given district resemble one another, with respect to the factors that shape peo-
ple's residential patterns, then it is likely that the district coincides with a single
geographic community. But if the subunits are highly dissimilar-and especial-
ly if they also display a high level of geographic clustering-then it is likely
that the district combines two or more distinct communities. In this Article's
terminology, the former district is spatially homogeneous while the latter is
spatially diverse.
I used two separate sets of data in my analysis, both aimed at capturing
Californians' "common social and economic interests." 54 First, I selected ap-
proximately one hundred variables from the American Community Survey, an
ongoing poll of the American public that is conducted by the Census Bureau.55
48. See CRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 1, 24.
49. Id. at 24.
50. Id.
51. The Commission did, however, calculate how many political subdivisions were
split by its districts. See id. app. at 4.
52. See supra notes 10-11. However, scholars frequently have made use of proxies for
communities of interest such as political subdivisions and media markets. See Stephanopou-
los, supra note 41, at 1451-54.
53. For a more detailed explanation, see Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 1936-41.
54. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
55. See About the American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www
.census.gov/acs/www/aboutthe-survey/americancommunity survey (last visited Feb. 29,
2012); see also Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting Developments of the Last Decade-and
What's on the Table in This One, 10 ELECTION L.J. 313, 316 (2011) (noting that ACS data
"may be useful to establish communities of interest where this is a state requirement").
2892012]
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The variables that I chose cover the five-year period from 2006-2010,56 have
been recognized by other researchers as being relevant to people's residential
arrangements,57 and fit mostly into the following categories: race, ethnicity,
age, income, education, profession, marital status, and housing. 58 Second, I ob-
tained the election results for all fifty California popular initiatives held be-
tween 2006 and 2010.59 These initiatives spanned a wide array of important is-
sues: taxes, spending, crime, abortion, energy, the environment, government
reform, etc. They constitute the most reliable sources of information about Cal-
ifornians' policy preferences at lower geographic levels.
Fortunately, both the ACS variables and the PI election results were avail-
able for census tracts. Tracts have about 4000 people each and are designed to
be "as homogeneous as possible with respect to population characteristics, eco-
nomic status, and living conditions." 60 Because of their small size and internal
uniformity, they are the most common units of analysis for social scientists
who study the U.S. population.61 These same characteristics make them ideal
for my investigation of district-community congruence. There are about 110
tracts in each assembly district, about 170 in each congressional district, and
about 220 in each senate district. These numbers are more than large enough to
make it meaningful whether California districts' constituent tracts resemble or
differ from one another along key dimensions.
After acquiring the ACS and PI data at the tract level, I carried out a statis-
tical procedure known as factor analysis. 62 Factor analysis is a commonly used
tool for simplifying and rendering intelligible large volumes of data.63 It col-
lapses many raw variables into a handful of composite factors, all of which are
linear functions of the raw variables and are calculated so as to capture as much
56. This data was released on December 8, 2011. See American Community Survey:
2010 Data Release, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data
documentation/2010_release (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
57. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 1937 n.173.
58. 1 used exactly the same ACS variables as in my earlier work, with two minor ex-
ceptions: First, the latest ACS data release includes five occupation categories instead of six.
Second, I omitted median house value and median rent from my analysis because they were
missing for too many California tracts.
59. See California Election Census Block Data, STATEWIDE DATABASE, http://swdb
.berkeley.edu/ dl0/index election.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
60. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS TRACTS AND BLOCK NUMBERING AREAS 10-1,
available at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/GARM/ChlOGARM.pdf.
61. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 1937 n.171.
62. To be more specific, I employed principal factors analysis with Varimax rotation
but without Kaiser normalization, and I retained all factors with an eigenvalue greater than
two. I settled on this approach because it yielded the most intelligible composite factors and
captured the largest proportion of the data's original variance. While I also carried out a fac-
tor analysis for the combined ACS and PI data, the composite factors that emerged are
somewhat difficult to interpret, and I therefore do not dwell any further on the results of this
analysis.
63. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 1938 n.177.
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as possible of the data's original variance. It is a particularly powerful tech-
nique for "disentangl[ing] the sociospatial organization of [residential]
space."64 As Table 1 in the Appendix indicates, the ACS analysis produced six
factors that account for sixty-four percent of the data's original variance. 65 As
Table 2 shows, the PI analysis gave rise to three factors explaining eighty-
seven percent of the variance.66
Since these factors are the inputs for all of my spatial diversity calcula-
tions, it is worth briefly describing their identities. For the ACS analysis, the
factor with the greatest explanatory power is a joint measure of socioeconomic
status and Hispanic ethnicity. It distinguishes tracts whose residents are
wealthy, well-educated, white professionals from tracts whose residents are
poorer, less educated Hispanics working in blue-collar fields. 67 The next most
important factor corresponds to marital and residential situation. It differenti-
ates between tracts of married home-owners (mostly suburbs and rural areas)
and tracts of unmarried apartment-dwellers (mostly cities). The third and fifth
factors both revolve around race; they indicate, respectively, the proportions of
tracts' populations that are Asian-American and African-American. The fourth
factor is an indicator of sprawl; the tracts that score highest along it are low-
density areas with newer housing stock and highly mobile residents. Lastly, the
sixth factor is driven primarily by the age of tracts' inhabitants.
For the PI analysis, the factor with the greatest explanatory power is a
measure of fiscal policy preferences. It correlates highly with 2008 presidential
vote share (r = 0.84), and it distinguishes tracts whose voters favor higher tax
revenue and government spending (on items such as education, health care, and
the environment) from tracts whose voters have the opposite economic views.68
The next most important factor captures attitudes on social and cultural issues.
It correlates less highly with 2008 presidential vote share (r = -0.44), and it dif-
ferentiates between tracts based on whether their voters have conservative or
liberal positions on crime, abortion, drug legalization, same-sex marriage, and
the like. The third factor, which is far less significant than the first two, distills
Californians' opinions on the array of Native American gaming initiatives that
appeared on the ballot between 2006 and 2010.
64. Bernadette Hanlon, A Typology of Inner-Ring Suburbs: Class, Race, and Ethnicity
in U.S. Suburbia, CITY & COMMUNITY, Summer 2009, at 227.
65. See infra Appendix, Table 1.
66. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
67. That socioeconomic status and Hispanic ethnicity are combined in the same factor
shows how closely interrelated they are in California. In my analysis of the country as a
whole, they each emerge as separate factors. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 1939.
68. This factor also encompasses voters' attitudes on government reform issues such
as redistricting. No ACS factor had anywhere near this high a correlation with presidential
vote share; the highest such correlation was -0.47 for the urban/suburban factor. As noted
later, the significant overlap between the most important PI factor and partisan preference is
a good reason for the ACS factors to receive priority in the community-of-interest analysis.
See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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After I generated these composite factors, I calculated scores along them
for all of the census tracts in California. These scores simply show how the
tracts perform in terms of the newly created factors. I then computed the stand-
ard deviation, with regard to each factor, of the tracts within each old and new
assembly, senate, and congressional district.69 I was able to determine which
tracts are located in which districts using Caliper Corporation's Maptitude for
Redistricting software. 70 Standard deviation, of course, is the most common
statistical measure of heterogeneity. Districts whose tracts are relatively simi-
lar, in terms of a particular factor, have a low standard deviation in this respect.
Districts whose tracts are relatively dissimilar have a high standard deviation.
Finally, I computed separate weighted averages of each district's standard
deviations for the ACS and P1 factors. The weights that I used, not surprisingly,
were the proportions of the data's original variance that the factors each ex-
plained. So, for the ACS analysis, a district's standard deviation for the first
factor (socioeconomic status) counted for more than its standard deviation for
the second (urban/suburban location), which in turn counted for more than its
standard deviation for the third (Asian-American population), and so forth
down the list. Similarly, for the PI analysis, heterogeneity of fiscal preferences
weighed (a bit) more heavily than heterogeneity of social and cultural attitudes,
which in turn weighed (much) more heavily than heterogeneity of gaming
views.
These weighted ACS and P1 averages are my core metrics of spatial diver-
sity. They reveal, with respect to vast amounts of demographic, socioeconomic,
and attitudinal information, the relative heterogeneity of California districts'
constituent census tracts. They are also the best available proxies for how
closely the districts correspond to geographic communities of interest. Districts
with high ACS or P1 spatial diversity scores are unlikely to contain "popula-
69. I calculated weighted standard deviations in order to take into account tracts' dif-
fering populations. In addition, while the vast majority of California's tracts are located en-
tirely within a single district, anywhere from seven to fifteen percent of the state's popula-
tion (depending on the district plan at issue) lives in tracts that are divided among two or
more districts. Since tracts are designed to be internally homogeneous, I simply included
split tracts in my calculations for all of the districts that contain them. But my results were
essentially identical when I excluded split tracts altogether from my analysis. Finally, it ar-
guably would be preferable to calculate the spatial diversity of the new districts using the
2006-2010 data, and the spatial diversity of the old districts using analogous data from ten
years earlier. Unfortunately, ACS data is not available at the census tract level for periods
before 2005-2009, and the popular initiatives of the 1990s were obviously different from
those of the 2000s. I therefore had no option but to calculate spatial diversity scores for both
sets of districts with respect to the same ACS and PI data.
70. This is the same software that I used to generate the district maps that are dis-
played later in the Article. See infra Part ll.B. I obtained the new district plans from the
Commission's website. See Current Status of Commission's Final Certified District Maps,
CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/maps-final
-drafts.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
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tion[s] which share[] common social and economic interests."7 1 By definition,
the tracts in these districts differ markedly from one another in terms of the
most significant ACS or PI factors. Conversely, districts with low spatial diver-
sity scores tend to coincide with "urban area[s]," "rural area[s]," "industrial ar-
eal]," or "agricultural area[s]," to name a few of the community types listed by
the California Constitution.7 These districts' tracts necessarily are similar to
one another along the most important axes identified by the factor analysis.
One last methodological point is worth noting. Because it is arithmetically
possible for a district's high spatial diversity to be the result of a checkerboard
tract pattern-rather than the fusion of distinct tract groups-I investigated to
what degree the tracts clustered geographically in terms of the various compo-
site factors. Fortunately, the degree of clustering was extremely high, allowing
me to reject the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation for almost every
district and factor that I examined.73 This means that a district's high spatial
diversity indeed indicates that it combines different spatial clusters of tracts
(i.e., geographic communities), not that its tracts merely happen to be arranged
in the form of a checkerboard.
III. RESULTS
This Article's principal goal is to evaluate how well the Citizens Redistrict-
ing Commission complied with its mandate to respect the integrity of Califor-
nia's geographic communities of interest. In this Part, I assess the Commis-
sion's performance in two different ways. First, I compare its new district plans
to both their predecessors and district plans in other states. I find, for the most
part, that the new plans have lower spatial diversity averages and fewer ex-
tremely spatially diverse districts than their antecedents, in terms of both the
ACS and PI factors. I also find that the new congressional plan's ACS spatial
diversity average, adjusted for California's intrinsic heterogeneity and large
number of districts, ranks nineteenth in the country instead of fifth. This is evi-
dence that the Commission did comply with its community preservation man-
date, but that it could have done an even better job.
Second, I present a series of vignettes that portray the Commission's per-
formance cartographically, using maps of districts and the factor scores of their
constituent tracts. I include examples of areas where the Commission was able
to raise dramatically the level of district-community congruence, areas where it
was unable to do so but through no fault of its own, and areas where more spa-
tially homogeneous districts indeed could have been drawn. The upshot of the-
71. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
72. Id.
73. I measured spatial autocorrelation by calculating the Global Moran's I for a wide
range of districts and with respect to all of the composite factors. The Global Moran's I
scores that I obtained were almost always positive (indicating spatial autocorrelation) and
highly statistically significant.
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se vignettes is the same as that of the overall analysis: The Commission-crafted
districts clearly correspond to geographic communities more closely than the
districts they replaced, but they could have been made more congruent still.
A. Overall Findings
As described above,74 I calculated spatial diversity scores for California's
old and new assembly, senate, and congressional districts with respect to both
the ACS and PI factors. These scores, along with additional information about
the spatial diversity distributions of the district plans, are provided in Tables 3-
8 in the Appendix. 75 In this Part, I use the scores to compare the old and new
plans along several dimensions: their spatial diversity averages, their numbers
of outlier districts, the shapes of their distributions, and their regression residu-
als compared to those of other states.
1. District plan averages
To begin with, the most straightforward way to assess the plans is simply
to compute their spatial diversity averages. Averages are preferable here to me-
dians because they take into account the edges of distributions rather than just
their centers. That is, averages respond to changes in the characteristics of ex-
treme districts-which, especially at the high spatial diversity end, are precisely
the sorts of districts on which we might expect the Commission to have fo-
cused.76 For the same reason, another recent study also _rovided only com-
pactness averages for the old and new California districts. 77
As Figure 1 illustrates, the new assembly, senate, and congressional dis-
tricts, on average, are all more spatially homogeneous than their predecessors
with respect to the ACS factors. The improvement is quite small for the assem-
bly districts (0.73 to 0.72), but somewhat more substantial for the senate and
congressional districts (0.79 to 0.76 and 0.77 to 0.74, respectively). As Figure 2
shows, the story is more equivocal for the PI factors. The old and new congres-
sional districts have the same average (0.64), the assembly districts improved
marginally (0.60 to 0.59), and only the senate districts experienced a noticeable
74. See supra Part 11.
75. See infra Appendix, Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8. Districts' ACS and PI scores are fair-
ly closely related, with their correlations ranging from 0.59 (for the new senate plan) to 0.74
(for the old senate plan).
76. Nevertheless, median spatial diversity scores are provided in the Appendix for
each district plan. See supra note 75. Like their spatial diversity averages, the new district
plans' medians also declined, though not quite to the same extent.
77. See Kogan & McGhee, supra note 9, at 18-19; see also Hofeller & Grofman, supra
note 18, at 284-86 (same for 1970s and 1980s California districts).
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downtick in spatial diversity (0.67 to 0.65). Statistical mean-comparison tests
paint essentially the same picture. 78
Several points follow from these results. First, to the extent that spatial
homogeneity is a valid proxy for district-community congruence, the new dis-
tricts do correspond more closely to geographic communities than the districts
they replaced. However, their increase in congruence is relatively modest, at
least by this measure: only 0 to 0.03 (or zero to four percent), depending on the
relevant district plan and factor set. Second, there does not appear to be any
significant conflict between respect for communities of interest and other
common redistricting criteria. The new California districts perform better in
terms of both spatial homogeneity and dimensions such as compactness, com-
petitiveness, partisan fairness, and minority representation.79
Third, the Commission seems to have paid more attention to demographic
and socioeconomic information (i.e., the ACS variables) than to voters' policy
preferences (i.e., the PI results). None of the district plans improved as much
with respect to the P1 factors as the senate and congressional plans improved
along the ACS factors. Since the P1 factors overlap substantially with voters'
partisan views, 80 which the Commission is forbidden from considering," its
apparent prioritization of objective census data is both unsurprising and legally
appropriate. Fourth, the rise in spatial homogeneity was greater for the senate
districts than for the assembly or congressional districts. The senate districts
underwent the largest increase in terms of both the ACS and P1 factors, while
the assembly districts barely budged in either dimension, and the congressional
districts' P1 average (unlike their ACS average) remained completely flat.
Lastly, for both sets of factors, and under both the old and new plans, the
larger an electoral district is, the more spatially diverse it tends to be. In other
words, senate districts are more spatially diverse (on average) than congres-
sional districts, which in turn are more spatially diverse (on average) than as-
sembly districts. 82 This is the same relationship that social scientists have found
78. Two-sample mean-comparison t-tests result in the following p-values: ACS As-
sembly (0.30), ACS Senate (0.18), ACS Congress (0.15), PI Assembly (0.31), PI Senate
(0.21), PI Congress (0.50). These figures are consistent with the conclusion of small to mod-
est spatial diversity improvement that is implied by the raw averages.
79. See Kogan & McGhee, supra note 9, at 21 (also observing that "the apparent con-
flicts between the redistricting criteria were less pronounced than many redistricting scholars
may have expected").
80. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
81. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4) ("Communities of interest shall not include re-
lationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.").
82. Cf CRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 42 (noting that "size of the [s]enate districts
[only] allowed the Commission to recognize broadly shared interests" and that "[t]here are a
number of cases where there were a variety of different interests in the [s]enate districts");
id. at 28 ("With [assembly] districts, the Commission was able to respect many local com-
munities of interest and group similar communities .... ).
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for other measures of geographic variation. 83 The explanation is simply that,
holding subunit size constant, larger entities contain more subunits and thus
capture more of the heterogeneity of any given variable.
Figure 1: District Plans' Average ACS Spatial Diversity Scores
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2. Outlier districts
Of course, spatial diversity averages are not the only way to assess the
Commission's performance with respect to district-community congruence.
Another reasonable approach is to count the number of outlier districts in the
various plans-i.e., districts that exceed a certain (high) spatial diversity
threshold. 84 These are the districts that are most likely to combine different ge-
ographic communities, thanks to the highly dissimilar clusters of tracts that
they contain. These are the districts, that is, that are least apt to encompass
"conti uous population[s] which share[] common social and economic inter-
ests.
After examining the plans' spatial diversity distributions, I set thresholds of
0.90 for the ACS factors and 0.80 for the PI factors. While somewhat arbitrary,
these thresholds do clearly distinguish the most spatially diverse districts from
the remaining portions of the distributions.86 For the ACS factors, as Figure 3
illustrates, the number of districts above the threshold fell from six to five for
the Assembly, from nine to four for the Senate, and from eight to five for Con-
gress. For the P1 factors, as Figure 4 shows, the number of districts above the
threshold stayed constant at five for the Assembly, decreased from seven to
four for the Senate, and increased from six to seven for Congress.
These results have implications that are mostly similar to those of the spa-
tial diversity averages.87 Again, the overall story is one of improvement, with
the total number of outlier districts declining with respect to both the ACS and
PI factors. Again, no conflict is evident between respect for communities of in-
terest and other redistricting criteria. Again, the differences between the old and
new district plans are noticeably greater in terms of the ACS factors. And
again, the rise in district-community congruence is clearest for the Senate,
which experienced a sharp drop in outlier districts according to both sets of fac-
tors.
Unlike the spatial diversity averages, however, these results suggest that
the Commission-crafted districts may be significantly (not just modestly) better
than their predecessors, at least with respect to the ACS factors. While the vari-
ous district plans' ACS averages decreased only moderately, their numbers of
ACS outlier districts dropped fairly dramatically: by seventeen percent for the
Assembly, thirty-eight percent for Congress, and fifty-six percent for the Sen-
ate. If these extreme districts are the real problem-the districts that are most
84. One could also examine the numbers of districts with unusually low spatial diversi-
ty scores. With anti-gerrymandering provisions like California's community preservation
requirement, however, it seems more appropriate to focus on districts that might violate the
requirement than districts that might comply with it particularly well.
85. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
86. The results remain almost identical if other similar thresholds are used.
87. See supra Part I.A. 1.
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likely to merge different geographic communities and hence to violate the Cali-
fornia Constitution-then the new plans seem substantially less worrisome than
their antecedents. Their spatial diversity averages may be only somewhat low-
er, but they contain many fewer of the community-disruptive districts that
helped cause the adoption of Propositions 11 and 20.88
Figure 3: ACS Outlier Districts (Spatial Diversity > 0.90)
Figure 4: P1 Outlier Districts (Spatial Diversity > 0.80)
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88. See Kogan & McGhee, supra note 9, at 6 (noting that new "criteria represented a
backlash against perceived abuses of the 2001 process, including districts that split cities");
see also TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 11, supra note I ("Voters in many commu-
nities have no political voice because they have been split into as many as four different dis-
tricts . . . ."); TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 20, supra note I ("Cities, counties, and
communities are currently split between bizarrely jagged congressional districts .... .").
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3. District plan distributions
Still another way to compare the old and new district plans is to examine
not just their averages and outliers, but rather their entire spatial diversity dis-
tributions. To do so, I created kernel density estimations-which are essentially
smoother versions of histograms-for all six plans at issue. 89 These estima-
tions, which are displayed in Figures 5-7, show the proportions of districts in
the plans that possess each particular level of spatial diversity. They reveal, in
other words, the distributions' averages, outliers, and specific shapes.
For the most part, the kernel density estimations provide further confirma-
tion of this Part's earlier findings. The new district plan curves tend to be posi-
tioned slightly to the left of the old curves, indicating their lower spatial diver-
sity averages. The right-hand ends of the new curves also typically fall below
the right-hand ends of the old curves, denoting the smaller numbers of outlier
districts in the new plans. Furthermore, the gaps between the old and new
curves are most pronounced for the senate districts and least pronounced for the
assembly districts, with respect to both the ACS and PI factors. And the con-
gressional districts improved noticeably according to the ACS curves, but ei-
ther stayed the same or deteriorated according to the P1 curves.
The kernel density estimations also add to the above results in several
ways. First, they show that the spatial diversity distributions for the Assembly
and Congress are approximately normal, while the senate distributions are
skewed to the right. The senate curves have right tails that are clearly more
conspicuous than those of the assembly and congressional curves. Second, the
estimations demonstrate that the Commission not only decreased the proportion
of highly spatially diverse districts, but also increased the proportion of highly
spatially homogeneous districts. The left-hand ends of the new curves are gen-
erally located above the left-hand ends of the old curves. Lastly, it is interesting
that the old and new curves for each plan, despite the differences I have identi-
fied, do not typically look that dissimilar. It seems that the Commission did not
bring about the wholesale transformation of California's districts-indeed, it
may be, given the state's underlying political geography, that no plausible maps
can result in such sweeping upheaval.90
89. For another example of kernel density estimations being used to analyze Califor-
nia's districts, see Kogan & McGhee, supra note 9, at 12-14, 18.
90. See infra Part II1.B.2 (noting that it seems to be impossible to draw spatially ho-
mogeneous districts in the East Bay). The old and new PI curves for the congressional plans,
whose shapes are quite dissimilar, are the one notable exception. Interestingly, the PI curves
suggest that the new congressional plans differ dramatically from their predecessors, while
the ACS curves imply a much greater degree of continuity.
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Figure 5: Assembly Spatial Diversity Kernel Density Estimations
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4. Inter-state comparisons
The analysis to this point establishes that the new California districts tend
to be more congruent with geographic communities than their predecessors, but
it gives no sense of how either the old or new districts fare relative to their
peers around the country. This issue can be tackled only with respect to con-
gressional districts and the ACS factors. State legislative districts vary too
much in their population and number of representatives to be compared effec-
tively, and it is only California's voters, of course, who get to express their
views on the state's many popular initiatives. My source for other states' con-
gressional spatial diversity averages is a recent article of mine that relied on
2005-2009 (rather than 2006-2010) ACS data.91
As noted above, California's ACS average was 0.77 for the old congres-
sional plan and 0.74 for the new plan.92 The analogous figure that I calculated
for the old plan in my previous paper, using data for the entire country rather
than just California, was 0.81-the second-highest score in America. 93 if we
assume (quite reasonably 94) that the new plan improved to the same degree ac-
cording to the nationwide data, then its average would be 0.79. This would still
be the second-highest score in America, which suggests, at first glance, that the
Commission did not improve matters much at all.
Spatial diversity averages, however, are relatively poor metrics for inter-
state comparisons. This is because the averages are driven not only by states'
district-drawing choices, but also by their intrinsic levels of geographic hetero-
geneity and the numbers of districts that they possess. The more heterogeneous
a state's census tracts are, the more heterogeneous its districts tend to be. And
the more districts a state has, keeping its intrinsic heterogeneity constant, the
less heterogeneous its districts tend to be. These considerations are irrelevant
for assessments of district plans for the same state, but they are highly prob-
lematic for inter-state comparisons.
To circumvent these difficulties, I regressed the raw spatial diversity aver-
ages against states' intrinsic levels of geographic heterogeneity as well as their
numbers of districts. 95 I then calculated the residual for each state, that is, the
difference between the state's actual spatial diversity average and the average
predicted by the regression. A positive residual indicates that a state's districts
91. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 1993 tbl. 5.
92. See supra Part III.A. 1.
93. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 1993 tbl. 5.
94. The spatial diversity scores that I calculated in this Article for California's old
congressional districts, using 2006-20 10 ACS data for California alone, have a correlation of
0.96 with the analogous scores that I calculated in my previous paper, using 2005-2009 ACS
data for the country as a whole.
95. See infra Appendix, Table 9. All of the regressions that I ran for this Article used
ordinary least squares.
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are more spatially diverse than one would expect given the state's intrinsic het-
erogeneity and number of districts, presumably because of community-
disrupting district-drawing choices. Conversely, a negative residual means that
a state's districts are less spatially diverse than one would expect, presumably
because of community-preserving district-drawing choices.96
As Figure 8 illustrates, California's old congressional plan had a positive
residual of 0.033-the fifth-highest in the country. California falls well above
the best fit line in the chart, revealing that its old districts were very spatially
diverse even after accounting for the state's intrinsic heterogeneity and large
number of districts. But, as Figure 9 shows, California's new congressional
plan has a positive residual of only 0.012-the nineteenth-highest in the coun-
try. California now falls much closer to (though still above) the best fit line,
consistent with a position in the middle of the spatial diversity pack.97
These results demonstrate that the Commission succeeded in making Cali-
fornia's congressional districts significantly more congruent with geographic
communities, relative to their peers around the country. A drop from fifth place
nationwide to nineteenth, from well above the best fit line to right on top of it,
is a genuine accomplishment. At the same time, the results highlight the need
for further improvement. The middle of the pack is preferable to the rear, but
California probably should be able to do better still since it now has the coun-
try's most detailed and most highly prioritized community preservation re-
quirement. In particular, there is no obvious reason why California should lag
so far behind other large and diverse states such as Illinois, New York, and
Virginia, all of which boast impressive negative residuals. Much progress has
thus been made, but California cannot yet rest on its redistricting laurels.
96. See JIA WANG, MEASURING COUNTRY PERFORMANCE ON HEALTH: SELECTED
INDICATORS FOR 115 COUNTRIES 6 (1999) (discussing use of regression residuals as perfor-
mance measures).
97. The results are similar if states with only one congressional district (whose raw
spatial diversity averages and levels of intrinsic heterogeneity are necessarily identical) are
omitted from the analysis. In that case, California's residual goes from third in the country to
tenth.
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Figure 8: Actual Versus Predicted Spatial Diversity Averages (Old California Plan)
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Figure 9: Actual Versus Predicted Spatial Diversity Averages (New California
Plan)
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B. Selected Vignettes
If the Commission's community preservation record is good but not excel-
lent, what is the explanation for its performance? How did it manage to raise
the level of district-community congruence in some areas, and why was it una-
ble to do so in others? A full answer to these questions would require a detailed
district-by-district examination of both the old and new plans, and is thus be-
yond the scope of this Article. In this Part, however, I present a series of vi-
gnettes that illuminate some of the district-drawing choices that the Commis-
sion made. I include both success stories, i.e., areas where the Commission-
crafted districts are more spatially homogeneous than their predecessors, and
potential shortfalls, i.e., areas where the new districts are still as spatially di-
verse as the old ones. These vignettes, of course, capture only a small subset of
the issues with which the Commission grappled. But they should still give a
sense of how a conscientious line-drawer might attempt (and sometimes fail) to
respect geographic communities.
I display only ACS factors in this Part's maps-socioeconomic status, ur-
ban versus suburban location, Asian-American population, etc. Since the plans
evinced much less improvement with respect to the PI factors, and since the
Commission arguably is barred from considering them, it seemed sensible to
focus on the results of the ACS analysis. The shades of the census tracts in the
maps reflect their scores along the various factors. For example, in a map
showing socioeconomic status, the populations of the darkest tracts are very af-
fluent while the residents of the lightest tracts are highly disadvantaged. 98
1. Success stories
In order to reduce the plans' spatial diversity averages and numbers of out-
lier districts, the Commission necessarily had to raise the level of district-
community congruence in many areas across California. Here I discuss three of
the Commission's successes, one for each plan and for each of the three most
important ACS factors. Again, these examples are suggestive but too few to be
definitive.
First, in the old congressional plan, District 28 was the fourth-worst in the
state in terms of overall spatial diversity (0.94), and the very worst in terms of
socioeconomic heterogeneity (1.28).99 As Figure 10 illustrates, it combined a
98. For information on which raw variables are included in each composite factor, see
Appendix, Table 1.
99. See infra Appendix, Table 4. Each factor has an overall standard deviation, taking
into account all of the tracts in California, of 1.0. So if an individual district has a standard
deviation of 1.0 for a given factor, this means that its tracts are as heterogeneous along this
dimension as the state as a whole. This is a very high level of heterogeneity.
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poor and heavily Hispanic portion of the San Fernando Valley with very
wealthy and white locales such as Beverly Park, Sherman Oaks, and Studio
City. In the new congressional plan, in contrast, District 28's successor, District
29, no longer includes these affluent precincts. Instead, it swells to the north,
east, and west, subsuming additional underprivileged areas in North Holly-
wood, Sun Valley, and Van Nuys. As a result, District 29 ranks thirty-first in
the state in overall spatial diversity (0.72), and thirteenth in socioeconomic het-
erogeneity (0.8 1).10 It plainly corresponds more closely than its predecessor to
an "area[] in which people share similar living standards . . . [and] have similar
work opportunities."10 1
Nor did the Commission have to make significant sacrifices in adjacent
districts in order to realize this gain. Old District 27, the main constituency into
which new District 29 expanded, ranked thirtieth in California in overall spatial
diversity (0.73).102 Its successor, new District 30, ranks twenty-second, with an
overall score that is only slightly higher (0.76).103 Similarly, the successors to
the other two districts that bordered old District 28 have close to the same over-
all spatial diversity as the districts they replaced. New District 28 is slightly less
spatially diverse than old District 29 (0.84 versus 0.85), while new District 33
is slightly more spatially diverse than old District 30 (0.77 versus 0.73).104
Compared to the dramatic improvement from old District 28 to new District 29,
these differences in the adjacent districts are trivial. The Commission barely
had to reduce the level of district-community congruence anywhere else in or-
der to raise it impressively in the heart of the San Fernando Valley.
100. See infra Appendix, Table 3.
101. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4). New District 29 is also more geographically com-
pact than old District 28 and more conducive to minority representation, thanks to its His-
panic citizen voting-age population (CVAP) majority.
102. See infra Appendix, Table 4.
103. See infra Appendix, Table 3.
104. See infra Appendix, Tables 3 & 4.
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Figure 10: Socioeconomic Status Maps (Old and New Congressional Plans)
Second, in the old senate plan, District 23 was the second-worst in the state
in terms of overall spatial diversity (1.01), and the very worst in terms of ur-
ban/suburban heterogeneity (1.25).105 As Figure 11 illustrates, it joined the
Westside of Los Angeles, including urban neighborhoods such as Santa Monica
and West Hollywood, with a string of suburbs to the city's northwest: Agoura
Hills, Calabasas, Malibu, Topanga, etc. Its western end (not shown on the map)
encompassed most of the city of Oxnard. In the new senate plan, in contrast,
District 23's principal successor, District 27, is confined to suburbs in the San
Fernando Valley and the Santa Monica Mountains. It no longer ventures into
the urban cores of Los Angeles and Oxnard, and, as the Commission noted in
its final report, "[it] maintains the coastal mountain range and watershed" and
"reunites the [towns] . . . along the Highway 101 and 118 corridors." 106 As a
result, District 27 ranks twenty-fourth in the state in overall spatial diversity
(0.72), and fourteenth in urban/suburban heterogeneity (0.89).107
Again, the Commission did not have to skimp much elsewhere in order to
make this improvement. New District 26, which now incorporates Santa Mon-
ica, West Hollywood, and other Los Angeles neighborhoods, is much more
spatially homogeneous than both old District 23 (0.80 versus 1.01) and the oth-
105. See infra Appendix, Table 6.
106. CRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 48.
107. See infra Appendix, Table 5. New District 28 is also more geographically compact
and more electorally competitive than old District 23.
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er urban district that it replaced, old District 28 (0.80 versus 1.00).108 Similarly,
new District 19, which picked up Oxnard after it was dropped from new Dis-
trict 27, is much more spatially homogeneous than old District 23 (0.84 versus
1.01), though it is more spatially diverse than its other predecessor district, old
District 19 (0.84 versus 0.73).109 The spatial diversity tradeoffs that the Com-
mission had to make in this region were thus relatively minor, with the gains in
district-community congruence easily exceeding the losses.
Figure 11: Urban/Suburban Maps (Old and New Senate Plans)
Lastly, in the old assembly plan, the compact Asian-American community
in the San Gabriel Valley was divided between two districts. As Figure 12 illus-
trates, District 44 included the northeastern half of the community (e.g., Arca-
dia, Mayflower Village, Temple City), while District 49 contained the south-
western half (e.g., Alhambra, Monterey Park, Rosemead, San Marino). Both of
these districts were fairly spatially diverse overall (0.83 and 0.82, respectively),
and highly spatially diverse with respect to Asian-American population (1.09
and 1.13)."i
In the new assembly plan, in contrast, almost the entire Asian-American
community is located in District 49, which is now a majority-minority district.
As the Commission stated, District 49 "shares commercial, cultural, [and] edu-
cational connections among the Asian-American residents of these cities, as
well as common concerns of recent immigrant populations, including language
108. See infra Appendix, Tables 5 & 6.
109. See infra Appendix, Tables 5 & 6.
110. See infra Appendix, Table 8.
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access [and] social services.""' Conversely, new District 41 is positioned fur-
ther to the north and east than its predecessor, old District 44, and it no longer
has a sizeable Asian-American presence. As a result, new Districts 41 and 49
are both more spatially homogeneous overall (0.73 and 0.77, respectively), and
more spatially homogeneous in terms of Asian-American population (0.51 and
0.98), than the districts they replaced.1 12 By creating a majority-minority dis-
trict in the San Gabriel Valley, the Commission was able to make both this dis-
trict and its northern neighbor more congruent with geographic communities.
Figure 12: Asian-American Maps (Old and New Assembly Plans)
2. Potential shortfalls
However, not all of the Commission's district-drawing choices were as
successful as the above three examples. In several areas across the state, the
new districts remain at least as spatially diverse as their antecedents. This is
why the new plans' spatial diversity averages are only somewhat lower, and
why a substantial number of outlier districts still exist. As I discuss below, Cal-
ifornia's underlying political geography sometimes made it almost impossible
for the Commission to craft districts that correspond closely to communities.
But sometimes the shortfalls seem to have been squarely its own responsibility.
111. CRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 36; see also id. at 20-21.
112. See infra Appendix, Table 7.
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San Francisco's East Bay nicely demonstrates why spatially homogeneous
districts cannot always be drawn.113 As Figure 13 illustrates, the region features
an unusual alternating pattern of very affluent and very disadvantaged areas. To
the north of struggling Oakland lie the wealthy towns of Berkeley, Kensington,
and Piedmont, and to the north of them are the poor cities of Richmond and San
Pablo. Further north and further south are largely middle-class locales, while
the interior is again highly prosperous.
The consequence of this pattern is that any district that includes most of the
East Bay likely will be very spatially diverse, at least in terms of socioeconom-
ic status. Any East Bay district likely will need to combine Oakland with
Berkeley, Richmond with Kensington, San Pablo with Piedmont. That old Sen-
ate District 9 had the third-highest spatial diversity in the state (1.00) therefore
should not be construed as a significant strike against it.1 14 Similarly, the
Commission bears little blame for the very high spatial diversity of new Senate
District 9 (0.99). 15 There simply was no reasonable way for the Commission
to draw much more spatially homogeneous senate districts in this region.l16
Even if the Commission had split the East Bay in two, as it did for its assembly
plan (for districts half as large), the results would not have been any better.
New Assembly District 18, which stretches south from Oakland, still ranks fifth
in the state in spatial diversity (0.90), while new Assembly District 15, which
joins Berkeley and Richmond, still ranks second (1.00). 17
113. San Francisco itself provides another good example. Because the city is highly
heterogeneous along multiple dimensions, districts that largely correspond to it, such as old
Congressional District 8 and new Congressional District 12, are also very spatially diverse.
See infra Appendix, Tables 3 & 4.
114. See infra Appendix, Table 6. The portion of the district that is not shown on the
map extended southeast into the interior of the East Bay.
115. See infra Appendix, Table 5. New District 9 at least is more geographically com-
pact than old District 9.
116. The Commission presumably could have drawn highly contorted East Bay districts
with lower spatial diversity scores, but such districts may well have violated California's ge-
ographic compactness requirement. See CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(5).
117. See infra Appendix, Table 7. Similarly, old Congressional District 9 was the most
spatially diverse in California (1.03), as is new Congressional District 13 (1.02). See infra
Appendix, Tables 3 & 4. Both of these districts occupied the bulk of the East Bay.
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Figure 13: Socioeconomic Status Maps (Old and New Senate Maps)
On the other hand, the Commission clearly could have drawn districts that
are more congruent with geographic communities in other parts of California.
For example, as Figure 14 illustrates, the concentrated African-American
community in South Los Angeles was divided between three districts in the old
congressional plan. Old Districts 33, 35, and 37 were each between 24 percent
and 31 percent black, and ranked first, second, and fifth in the state in spatial
diversity with respect to African-American population (1.65, 1.54, and 1.17,
respectively).' In the new plan, the situation remains exactly the same. The
South L.A. African-American community again is split between three districts
(none more than 25 percent black), and new Districts 37, 43, and 44 now rank
first, second, and third in African-American spatial diversity (1.73, 1.59, and
1.27, respectively). 1 19
But the Commission easily could have avoided this outcome. Instead of
fragmenting the African-American community, it could have united it in a sin-
gle district extending from View Park-Windsor Hills in the northwest, through
Inglewood and Compton, to Carson in the southeast. 12 0 Unlike the East Bay,
118. See infra Appendix, Table 4.
119. See infra Appendix, Table 3.
120. See CRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 19 (noting that South L.A. "African Americans
could form a majority CVAP in a reasonably compact geographic area in at least .. . one
congressional district").
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South L.A. presents no geographic complexities that prevent spatially homoge-
neous districts from being drawn. If anything, it is unusually easy to craft such
districts thanks to the pronounced clustering of the area's African-American
population. To be sure, the Commission had reasons for its choices: Consistent
with the views of African-American interest groups, it wished to preserve all
three congressional districts that are currently represented by African-American
politicians.121 But the California Constitution does not permit geographic
communities to be divided simply because some of their members consider di-
vision to be politically beneficial. And the Commission is explicitly barred
from taking into account "relationships with ... incumbents" in its community-
of-interest analysis.122 Accordingly, the Commission probably ought to have
replaced old Districts 33, 35, and 37 with a single, much more spatially homo-
geneous district encompassing most of the South L.A. African-American popu-
lation.123
Figure 14: African-American Maps (Old and New Congressional Plans)
121. See id. at 19-20.
122. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
123. The Commission further justified its district-drawing choices by noting that
"[s]ome members of the public suggested that the intentional creation of such a majority-
Black district could give rise to a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act based on
... a 'packing' claim." CRC REPORT, supra note 42, at 20. Since the African-American pop-
ulation in South L.A. is only numerous enough to constitute a bare majority of a single con-
gressional district, however, there was no reasonable basis for the Commission to fear a Sec-
tion 2 packing challenge. This may be why the Commission did not make the Section 2
argument itself, but rather attributed it to "[s]ome members of the public." Id.
3112012]
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A final example of the Commission's suboptimal district-drawing comes
from Central Los Angeles. As Figure 15 illustrates, old Assembly District 48
was quite spatially diverse both overall (0.88) and in terms of urban/suburban
location (0.88).124 It combined densely populated areas such as East Holly-
wood and Koreatown with neighborhoods such as Athens, Vermont Square,
and Westmont that contain mostly single-unit residences. New Assembly Dis-
trict 53 is just as geographically heterogeneous. It joins East Hollywood and
Koreatown with heavily inhabited Downtown, Pico-Union, and Westlake, but
then proceeds southeast into neighborhoods such as Boyle Heights and Hun-
tington Park that again are characterized by single-unit homes. It slightly ex-
ceeds old Assembly District 48 in both overall (0.89) and urban/suburban
(1.01) spatial diversity.125
What makes this story more interesting-and the lack of improvement be-
tween districts more surprising-is that in its draft plan, released in June 2011,
the Commission did manage to draw a spatially homogeneous district in this
region. 126 Draft Assembly District LADNT retained Downtown, East Holly-
wood, Koreatown, Pico-Union, and Westlake, but also incorporated dense ur-
ban areas such as Hollywood, Larchmont and Mid-Wilshire. Its overall spatial
diversity (0.83) was thus somewhat lower than old District 48's or new District
53's, and its urban/suburban heterogeneity (0.59) was much lower. 127
Why did the Commission redraw a perfectly fine provisional district? The
district's own racial composition is not the answer, as each of its variants (old,
draft, and new) had a Hispanic majority. A more likely explanation is that, in
response to criticism of its draft assembly plan, the Commission sought to in-
crease the number of Hispanic-majority districts elsewhere in Los Angeles. It
succeeded in doing so-these districts jumped in number between the draft and
final plans 12 8-but one of the apparent side effects was an increase in the over-
all level of spatial diversity. Notably, the draft assembly plan was the only one
of the three provisional maps to be more spatially homogeneous, on average,
than the final set of districts. Draft District LADNT thus seems to have been a
casualty of the Commission's effort to ensure greater representation in the As-
sembly for California's Hispanics. Here, at least, district-community congru-
ence was in tension with another important redistricting goal.
124. See infra Appendix, Table 8.
125. See infra Appendix, Table 7.
126. See Maps: First Draft, CALIFORNIA CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, http://
wedrawthelines.ca.gov/maps-first-drafts.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
127. Spatial diversity scores for the draft districts are on file with the author. Draft Dis-
trict LADNT was also more geographically compact and (slightly) more electorally competi-
tive than old District 48 and new District 53.
128. See Kogan & McGhee, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that number of Hispanic-
majority assembly districts increased from ten to fourteen between draft and final plans).
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Figure 15: Urban/Suburban Maps (Old, Draft, and New Assembly Plans)
CONCLUSION
In recent years, the idea that California might represent America's future
has been associated more with Cassandra than with Pollyanna. In the context of
redistricting, however, the prospect that America could eventually come to re-
semble California is cause for optimism, not gloom. As other scholars have
found, the new California districts-drawn by an independent commission ra-
ther than a self-interested legislature-are more compact, competitive, politi-
cally fair, and conducive to minority representation than their predecessors. 12 9
And as this Article has demonstrated, the new districts also are more congruent
129. See Kogan & McGhee, supra note 9.
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with geographic communities of interest than the districts they replaced. These
gains are not overwhelming in magnitude, but they are quite real, and there is
every reason to think that they could be realized in other states as well-if they
too abandoned legislative redistricting in favor of California's new model. Of
course, commission-crafted districts do not guarantee the optimization of every
criterion; one of this Article's findings is that California's level of district-
community congruence easily could have been higher still. But the evidence
that commissioners draw better districts than politicians, by just about every
objective standard, is becoming harder and harder to ignore.
In addition to evaluating California's new redistricting regime, this Article
has sought to introduce, and to employ, a methodology for determining how
closely districts correspond to geographic communities. This sort of analysis
has not previously been conducted; instead, scholars have settled for relatively
poor proxies for communities such as political subdivisions. But since almost
half the states require their districts to coincide with communities,130 and since
the country is currently in the throes of a redistricting cycle, the need for better
measures of district-community congruence is clear. So it is my hope that the
idea of appraising districts based on the heterogeneity of their constituent cen-
sus tracts will be applied soon to states beyond California. The concept of spa-
tial diversity has implications for almost every district plan, and it warrants a
place in the redistricting toolkit.
130. See NCSL REPORT, supra note 7, at 125-27.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Results of American Community Survey Factor Analysis
Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
SES Sta- Urban / Asian- Exurban African-
tus/. Suburban American Sprawl American AgeHispanic
Variance Explained 26.4% 13.4% 9.9% 5.7% 4.3% 4.1%
Income
Household Income 
-0.66
< $15K %
Household Income 0.71 0.45
> $150K %
Median Household 0.66 0.60
Income
Under Poverty 
-0.57 -0.56
Level %
Unemployment % -0.47
Education
Grad. Degree % 0.84
> HS Grad. % 0.89
> Bach. Degree % 0.92
Occupation /
Industry
Occupation 
- 0.93
Management %
Occupation - -0.58 
-0.40
Service %
Occupation - 0.42
Sales %
Occupation 
-
-0.69
Construction %
Occupation 
-
-0.80
Production %
Industry - 0.42
Agriculture %
Industry 
-
-0.47
Construction %
Industry -
Manufacturing %
Industry -
Wholesale Trade %
Industry -
Retail Trade %
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Industry -
Transportation %
Industry 
- 0.47
Information %
Industry 
- Finance 0.55
/ Real Estate %
Industry 
- 0.57
Professional %
Industry - Educa-
tion / Health %
Industry - Enter-
tainment / Hotel / -0.48
Food %
Industry -
Other Services %
Industry - 0.50
Public Admin. %
Household
Married 0.88
Household %
Nonfamily 0.48 
-0.75
Household %
Avg. Household Size -0.76 0.41
Housing
Housing Vacancy %
Detached 1-Unit % 0.83
20+-Unit % -0.64
Housing Built
After 2000 %
Housing Built
1950-70 %
Housing Built
Before 1950 %
Median Rooms 0.88
Owner-Occupied % 0.88
Renter-Occupied % -0.88
Race
Asian Indian % -0.47
Chinese % -0.65
Filipino % -0.52
Japanese %
Korean %
Vietnamese % -0.48
Other Asian %
White % 0.41 0.69
Black % -0.78
Am. Indian %
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Asian % -0.93
Hawaiian %
Other Race % -0.75
Hispanic % -0.89
Mexican % -0.88
Puerto Rican %
Cuban %
Other Hispanic % -0.53
Ethnicity
American %
Arab %
Czech %
Danish %
Dutch %
English % 0.63 0.47
French % 0.50
French Canadian %
German % 0.60 0.49
Greek %
Hungarian %
Irish % 0.60 0.48
Italian % 0.60
Lithuanian %
Norwegian % 0.45
Polish % 0.59
Portuguese %
Russian % 0.54
Scotch-Irish % 0.43
Scottish % 0.53
Slovak %
Sub-Saharan Afri- 
-0.47
can %
Swedish % 0.46
Swiss %
Ukrainian %
Welsh %
West Indian %
Age
Median Age 0.62 0.54
< 18 % -0.66
>65% 0.57
Other
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Veteran %
Moved Last Year % -0.49
Born in State % 0.52 0.41
Foreign-Born % -0.45 -0.69
Public Transit 
-0.48
Commute %
Mean Commute
Time
Population Density -0.51 -0.41
7,930 census tracts incorporated into factor analysis.
6 retained factors explain 63.9% of variance in data.
Only loadings greater than 0.4 or less than -0.4 displayed.
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Table 2: Results of Popular Initiative Factor Analysis
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Fiscal Views Social i Cultural Gaming ViewsViews
Variance Explained 42.8% 31.5% 12.9%
June 2006
Prop. 81 (education) 0.82
Prop. 82 (education) 0.91
Nov. 2006
Prop. 1A (transportation) 0.53
Prop. IB (transportation) 0.77
Prop. IC (housing) 0.94
Prop. ID (education) 0.89
Prop. 1E (environment) 0.75
Prop. 83 (crime) 0.78 0.48
Prop. 84 (environment) 0.87
Prop. 85 (abortion) 0.89
Prop. 86 (taxes) 0.60 -0.62
Prop. 87 (energy) 0.66 -0.70
Prop. 88 (education) 0.75 -0.43
Prop. 89 (campaigns) 0.54 -0.72
Prop. 90 (environment) -0.53 0.60
Feb. 2008
Prop. 91 (transportation) 0.69 0.43
Prop. 92 (education) 0.94
Prop. 93 (term limits) 0.87
Prop. 94 (gaming) 0.88
Prop. 95 (gaming) 0.88
Prop. 96 (gaming) 0.88
Prop. 97 (gaming) 0.88
June 2008
Prop. 98 (property) -0.54
Prop. 99 (property) 0.58 0.55
Nov. 2008
Prop. lA (transportation) 0.82 -0.43
Prop. 2 (environment) 0.64 -0.56
Prop. 3 (children) 0.93
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Prop. 4 (abortion) 0.93
Prop. 5 (crime) 0.73 -0.47
Prop. 6 (crime) 0.74
Prop. 7 (energy) 0.72
Prop. 8 (marriage) 0.94
Prop. 9 (crime) 0.86
Prop. 10 (environment) 0.83
Prop. 11 (redistricting) -0.73
Prop. 12 (veterans) 0.72
June 2010
Prop. 13 (taxes) -0.55
Prop. 14 (elections)
Prop. 15 (elections) 0.62 -0.58
Prop. 16 (elections) 0.74 0.41
Prop. 17 (regulation) 0.65 0.41
Nov. 2010
Prop. 19 (marijuana) -0.79
Prop. 20 (redistricting) -0.88
Prop. 21 (taxes) -0.83
Prop. 22 (spending) 0.69
Prop. 23 (environment) -0.66 0.68
Prop. 24 (taxes) 0.83 -0.41
Prop. 25 (spending) 0.75 -0.53
Prop. 26 (taxes) -0.59 0.70
Prop. 27 (elections) 0.93
7,963 census tracts incorporated into factor analysis.
3 retained factors explain 87.2% of variance in data.
Only loadings greater than 0.4 or less than -0.4 displayed.
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Table 3: Spatial Diversity Scores for New Congressional Districts
Dis- ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS PI Pl PI Pl
trict Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Over Fac- Fac- Fac- Overtor I tor 2 tor 3 tor 4 tor 5 tor 6 all tor I tor 2 tor 3 all
SES SocialS Ur- Asian Ex- Afri- SoiaStatus ban I - urban can- Fiscal C/l- ing
His- Sub- Amer Spra Amer Agetural Views
panic urban ican wl ican Views
1 0.40 0.71 0.32 0.58 0.50 0.79 0.50 0.41 0.83 0.55 0.58
2 0.68 0.70 0.39 1.10 0.55 0.67 0.67 0.40 0.97 0.67 0.64
3 0.65 0.80 0.73 0.62 0.90 0.96 0.73 0.60 0.97 0.57 0.73
4 0.42 0.77 0.44 0.51 0.56 1.10 0.56 0.40 0.49 0.62 0.47
5 0.53 0.72 0.92 0.56 1.07 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.57 0.85 0.64
6 0.72 0.80 0.81 0.56 0.74 0.70 0.74 0.65 0.84 0.48 0.69
7 0.52 0.76 0.98 0.63 0.67 0.80 0.68 0.67 0.45 0.42 0.55
8 0.55 0.76 0.37 0.70 0.80 0.89 0.62 0.67 0.44 0.60 0.58
9 0.64 0.77 0.83 0.63 1.04 0.76 0.73 0.81 0.41 0.55 0.63
10 0.57 0.61 0.54 0.38 0.69 0.72 0.57 0.69 0.35 0.51 0.54
11 0.94 0.93 0.73 0.58 0.93 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.78 0.62 0.79
12 0.85 1.03 1.27 0.76 0.83 1.27 0.97 0.58 0.92 0.76 0.73
13 1.06 1.09 0.89 0.78 1.19 0.97 1.02 0.64 1.17 0.64 0.83
14 0.76 0.79 1.15 0.62 0.72 0.92 0.82 0.73 0.66 0.59 0.68
15 0.75 0.78 1.31 0.53 0.72 1.03 0.84 0.73 0.38 0.54 0.58
16 0.56 0.72 0.60 0.57 0.94 0.80 0.64 0.80 0.45 0.45 0.62
17 0.69 0.85 1.08 0.54 0.56 1.16 0.79 0.56 0.56 0.46 0.55
18 0.77 1.04 0.95 0.70 0.50 0.79 0.83 0.59 0.73 0.46 0.62
19 0.81 0.93 1.20 0.55 0.50 0.72 0.85 0.81 0.73 0.42 0.73
20 1 .05 0.78 0.51 0.51 0.98 1.16 0.87 0.70 1.00 0.64 0.80
21 0.65 0.49 0.38 0.60 1.22 1.11 0.64 0.94 0.29 0.58 0.65
22 0.86 0.70 0.43 0.44 1.06 0.98 0.74 0.74 0.49 0.45 0.61
23 0.66 0.77 0.40 0.54 0.90 0.96 0.67 0.70 0.33 0.47 0.54
24 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.75 0.78 1.07 0.79 0.73 1.03 0.62 0.82
25 0.78 0.76 0.52 0.62 0.73 0.64 0.71 0.66 0.44 0.47 0.55
26 1.01 0.74 0.56 0.67 0.66 0.82 0.82 0.89 0.59 0.48 0.72
27 0.73 0.87 1.58 0.63 0.76 1.00 0.90 0.85 0.65 0.42 0.72
28 0.84 1.21 0.61 0.69 0.43 0.78 0.84 0.98 0.88 0.44 0.87
29 0.81 0.94 0.46 0.56 0.48 0.54 0.72 0.65 0.52 0.40 0.56
30 0.81 1.00 0.60 0.58 0.43 0.64 0.76 0.56 0.64 0.36 0.56
31 0.77 0.84 0.46 0.53 0.73 0.52 0.70 0.80 0.28 0.37 0.55
32 0.75 0.61 0.77 0.58 0.66 0.56 0.69 0.83 0.22 0.42 0.55
33 0.57 1.27 0.81 0.79 0.42 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.83 0.47 0.74
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34 0.81 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.66 0.81 0.88 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.53
35 0.63 0.65 0.50 0.55 0.80 0.53 0.61 0.63 0.30 0.39 0.47
36 0.87 0.67 0.33 0.58 0.77 1.49 0.75 0.80 0.65 0.97 0.77
37 1.18 0.78 0.52 0.85 1.73 0.72 0.97 0.72 1.07 1.00 0.89
38 0.70 0.64 1.02 0.66 0.67 0.52 0.72 0.78 0.27 0.46 0.55
39 0.66 0.80 1.21 0.47 0.43 0.64 0.74 0.73 0.27 0.40 0.51
40 0.51 0.54 0.23 0.60 0.69 0.45 0.49 0.66 0.22 0.53 0.48
41 0.71 0.75 0.40 0.59 0.85 0.61 0.66 0.63 0.40 0.35 0.51
42 0.54 0.65 0.51 0.53 0.75 1.03 0.60 0.50 0.21 0.43 0.39
43 0.88 0.74 0.87 0.62 1.59 0.78 0.87 1.01 0.53 1.00 0.84
44 0.63 0.66 0.65 0.77 1.27 0.62 0.70 0.57 0.35 0.94 0.54
45 0.67 0.94 0.83 0.66 0.39 1.14 0.76 0.63 0.52 0.47 0.57
46 0.70 0.6I 0.53 0.68 0.53 0.64 0.64 0.86 0.27 0.45 0.59
47 0.79 0.96 1.01 0.54 0.93 0.74 0.84 0.98 0.79 0.38 0.82
48 0.88 0.87 1.23 0.68 0.57 1.18 0.91 0.83 0.70 0.40 0.72
49 0.77 0.82 0.56 0.88 0.61 0.88 0.75 0.60 0.73 0.44 0.62
50 0.57 0.80 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.70 0.61 0.59 0.39 0.77 0.54
51 0.57 0.93 0.63 0.65 0.74 0.69 0.68 0.73 0.60 0.68 0.67
52 0.53 1.18 1.04 0.86 0.53 1.05 0.81 0.62 0.70 0.51 0.63
53 0.62 1.07 0.84 0.58 0.71 0.64 0.75 0.69 0.99 0.64 0.79
Min 0.40 0.49 0.23 0.38 0.39 0.45 0.49 0.40 0.21 0.35 0.39
Me-
dian 0.71 0.78 0.63 0.60 0.72 0.79 0.74 0.69 0.56 0.48 0.62
Mean 0.72 0.82 0.72 0.63 0.76 0.83 0.74 0.70 0.59 0.55 0.64
Max 1.18 1.27 1.58 1.10 1.73 1.49 1.02 1.01 1.17 1.00 0.89
0.16 0.17 0.31 0.13 0.28 0.22 0.12 0.14 0.25 0.17 0.12
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Table 4: Spatial Diversity Scores for Old Congressional Districts
. ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS PI PI PI PI
Is Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Over Fac- Fac- Fac- Overtor I tor 2 tor 3 tor 4 tor 5 tor 6 all tor I tor 2 tor 3 all
SES Social
Status Ur- Asian Ex- Afri- / Gam-ban / - urban can- AgeFiscal cu- ingSub- Amer Spra Amer Views tural ViewsHis urban ican wl ican Views
panic I Views
1 0.61 0.76 0.65 0.76 0.69 1.05 0.70 0.44 0.88 0.64 0.63
2 0.49 0.70 0.57 0.48 0.53 0.86 0.57 0.46 0.75 0.47 0.57
3 0.47 0.74 0.92 0.58 0.71 0.89 0.65 0.56 0.46 0.55 0.52
4 0.45 0.78 0.44 0.66 0.58 1.04 0.59 0.42 0.60 0.59 0.51
5 0.72 0.77 0.86 0.56 0.74 0.67 0.74 0.63 0.83 0.47 0.68
6 0.74 0.68 0.35 0.76 0.48 0.70 0.65 0.40 0.76 0.70 0.57
7 0.64 0.79 0.84 0.67 0.92 0.63 0.72 0.80 0.59 0.44 0.67
8 0.89 1.00 1.29 0.77 0.87 1.30 0.99 0.55 0.96 0.77 0.73
9 1.07 1.16 0.85 0.76 1.21 0.92 1.03 0.70 1.19 0.69 0.88
10 0.77 0.83 0.72 0.72 0.88 0.89 0.79 0.58 0.82 0.57 0.67
11 0.76 0.74 0.86 0.69 0.75 0.83 0.77 0.58 0.68 0.64 0.62
12 0.68 0.82 1.16 0.61 0.68 0.91 0.79 0.66 0.70 0.66 0.68
13 0.75 0.84 1.21 0.54 0.80 1.05 0.84 0.60 0.52 0.47 0.55
14 0.89 0.97 1.20 0.71 0.57 0.90 0.92 0.63 0.73 0.45 0.64
15 0.70 0.86 1.44 0.57 0.51 0.92 0.84 0.61 0.60 0.42 0.58
16 0.86 0.94 1.20 0.58 0.49 0.80 0.88 0.85 0.74 0.39 0.74
17 1.07 0.79 0.53 0.52 0.98 1.18 0.88 0.70 1.01 0.62 0.80
18 0.59 0.68 0.67 0.56 0.96 0.80 0.66 0.82 0.37 0.46 0.61
19 0.72 0.68 0.49 0.42 0.94 1.13 0.69 0.71 0.54 0.49 0.62
20 0.62 0.64 0.51 0.63 1.21 1.05 0.68 0.89 0.43 0.55 0.68
21 0.78 0.64 0.47 0.46 1.09 1.04 0.71 0.80 0.42 0.44 0.61
22 0.74 0.84 0.41 0.59 0.88 1.01 0.72 0.75 0.73 0.41 0.69
23 0.98 1.01 0.57 0.84 0.87 1.09 0.91 0.81 1.05 0.49 0.85
24 0.82 0.74 0.41 0.67 0.59 0.84 0.71 0.63 0.64 0.72 0.65
25 0.70 0.77 0.42 0.84 0.82 0.78 0.70 0.73 0.58 0.54 0.65
26 0.69 0.82 1.12 0.58 0.69 0.67 0.77 0.66 0.64 0.36 0.61
27 0.82 0.92 0.52 0.53 0.47 0.54 0.73 0.70 0.47 0.37 0.57
28 1.28 1.00 0.49 0.59 0.44 0.64 0.94 0.63 0.88 0.38 0.69
29 0.68 0.90 1.34 0,69 0.70 0.91 0.85 0.75 0.56 0.40 0.63
30 0.46 1.44 0.62 0,77 0.41 0.72 0.73 0.69 0.62 0.41 0.62
31 0.86 0.94 0.72 1.03 0.58 0.77 0.85 0.52 0.72 0.54 0,59
32 0.66 0.58 1.14 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.23 0.41 0.48
33 1.02 0.90 0.93 0.86 1.65 0.92 1.00 0.60 1.02 0.90 0.80
2012]
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34 0.68 1.00 0.63 0.85 0.79 0.62 0.76 0.71 0.43 0.53 0.58
35 0.90 0.66 0.55 0.68 1.54 0.66 0.81 0.75 0.53 0.96 0.70
36 1.07 0.94 0.97 0.58 0.55 0.85 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.42 0.85
37 0.83 0.90 0.78 0.67 1.17 0.65 0.83 0.80 0.70 0.96 0.79
38 0.69 0.61 0.86 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.67 0.71 0.25 0.39 0.49
39 0.83 0.59 0.94 0.81 0.61 0.58 0.76 0.99 0.24 0.46 0.64
40 0.73 0.74 0.85 0.48 0.42 0.66 0.70 0.76 0.31 0.46 0.55
41 0.58 0.67 0.50 0.58 0.66 0.86 0.61 0.63 0.43 0.63 0.56
42 0.65 0.67 1.15 0.46 0.50 0.74 0.71 0.65 0.30 0.46 0.49
43 0.55 0.77 0.38 0.52 0.84 0.51 0.58 0.59 0.20 0.40 0.42
44 0.86 0.83 0.49 0.58 0.74 0.67 0.75 0.79 0.40 0.37 0.59
45 0.80 0.80 0.41 0.58 1.05 1.37 0.77 0.82 0.55 0.80 0.72
46 0.81 0.91 1.27 0.60 0.64 0.97 0.88 0.80 0.71 0.36 0.70
47 0.63 0.61 0.87 0.77 0.54 0.79 0.68 0.70 0.32 0.40 0.52
48 0.71 0.87 0.92 0.64 0.40 1.12 0.78 0.58 0.54 0.45 0.55
49 0.68 0.74 0.38 0.74 0.73 0.95 0.67 0.69 0.41 0.58 0.57
50 0.81 0.84 0.92 0.65 0.44 0.93 0.80 0.50 0.76 0.56 0.60
51 0.57 0.81 0.74 0.61 0.80 0.71 0.67 0.71 0.54 0.70 0.65
52 0.57 0.83 0.73 0.62 0.60 0.81 0.67 0.64 0.61 0.78 0.65
53 1.04 0.97 0.77 0.71 0.68 0.80 0.92 0.77 1.04 0.65 0.85
Min 0.45 0.58 0.35 0.42 0.40 0.51 0.57 0.40 0.20 0.36 0.42
dMan 0.73 0.81 0.74 0.63 0.69 0.84 0.75 0.69 0.60 0.49 0.63
Mean 0.75 0.82 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.77 0.68 0.62 0.54 0.64
Max 1.28 1.44 1.44 1.03 1.65 1.37 1.03 0.99 1.19 0.96 0.88
St. 0.17 0.15 0.29 0.12 0.27 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.15 0.10
Dev.
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Table 5: Spatial Diversity Scores for New Senate Districts
Dis- ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS PI P1 P1 PlDis- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Over Fac- Fac- Fac- Overtrict tor I tor 2 tor 3 tor 4 tor 5 tor 6 all tor I tor 2 tor 3 all
SES Social
Status Ur- Asian Ex- Afri-ban / - urban can- AgeFiscal Cul- ing
His- Sub- Amer Spra Amer Views tural Vies
panic urban ican wI ican Views
1 0.43 0.80 0.47 0.65 0.53 0.95 0.57 0.40 0.69 0.74 0.56
2 0.70 0.68 0.39 1.03 0.53 0.74 0.67 0.42 0.93 0.66 0.64
3 0.62 0.79 0.84 0.69 1.01 0.86 0.74 0.60 0.83 0.72 0.70
4 0.53 0.76 0.53 0.56 0.67 0.89 0.62 0.48 0.68 0.61 0.57
5 0.59 0.73 0.78 0.52 0.85 0.73 0.67 0.78 0.37 0.52 0.59
6 0.69 0.88 0.90 0.57 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.67 0.78 0.48 0.68
7 0.79 0.86 0.76 0.57 0.80 0.94 0.79 0.67 0.65 0.48 0.63
8 0.59 0.76 0.69 0.49 0.67 1.01 0.67 0.70 0.46 0.56 0.59
9 1.04 1.07 0.84 0.74 1.15 0.92 0.99 0.63 1.20 0.67 0.84
10 0.71 0.81 1.33 0.49 0.83 1.11 0.84 0.55 0.44 0.48 0.50
11 0.85 1.14 1.29 0.80 0.88 1.23 1.00 0.57 1.06 0.82 0.78
12 0.59 0.60 0.41 0.48 1.10 0.97 0.62 0.85 0.59 0.64 0.73
13 0.86 0.93 1.02 0.69 0.69 1.08 0.89 0.64 0.74 0.42 0.65
14 0.62 0.60 0.48 0.62 1.12 1.00 0.65 0.93 0.40 0.51 0.67
15 0.95 0.95 1.25 0.58 0.53 0.86 0.93 0.89 0.77 0.42 0.78
16 0.62 0.69 0.41 0.62 0.81 1.02 0.64 0.68 0.35 0.51 0.54
17 0.80 0.95 0.80 0,64 0.63 0.94 0.81 0.74 0.95 0.61 0.80
18 1.08 0.98 0.50 0.60 0.49 0.57 0.86 0.73 0.70 0.39 0.67
19 0.94 0.89 0.54 0.70 0.85 1.00 0.84 0.82 0.95 0.58 0.83
20 0.65 0.69 0.50 0.56 0.84 0.52 0.63 0.65 0.28 0.40 0.48
21 0.65 0.72 0.40 0.68 0.73 0.69 0.64 0.69 0.50 0.47 0.59
22 0.79 0.68 1.27 0.69 0.67 0.76 0.82 0.75 0.30 0.43 0.54
23 0.63 0.79 0.50 0.49 0.75 1.02 0.67 0.70 0.36 0.49 0.54
24 0.89 0.97 0.91 088 0.57 0.81 0.88 0.49 0.71 0.51 0.57
25 0.71 0.97 0.62 0,59 0.59 0.71 0.73 0.84 0.68 0.37 0.71
26 0.60 1.35 0.80 0.77 0.48 0.77 0.80 0.84 0.81 0.42 0.77
27 0.77 0.89 0.60 0.60 0.44 0.69 0.72 0.57 0.58 0.41 0.55
28 0.81 0.82 0.40 0.55 0.82 1.29 0.76 0.87 0.55 0.78 0.74
29 0.71 0.80 1.07 0.47 0.52 0.62 0.75 0.73 0.24 0.41 0.51
30 1.15 0.83 0.48 0.88 1.70 0.64 0.96 0.63 0.95 1.03 0.80
31 0.70 0.78 0.45 0.57 0.85 0.63 0.67 0.69 0.36 0.37 0.53
32 0.65 0.65 1.02 0.65 0.56 0.53 0.70 0.74 0.28 0.39 0.52
33 0.91 0.80 0.43 0.96 0.77 0.45 0.78 0.81 0.56 0.45 0.66
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34 0.95 0.70 1.10 0.80 0.64 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.61 0.42 0.77
35 0.74 0.79 0.87 0.62 1.46 0.76 0.81 0.81 0.39 0.91 0.67
36 0.69 0.79 0.40 0.75 0.57 0.93 0.68 0.60 0.58 0.41 0.56
37 0.79 0.89 0.84 0.61 0.39 1.04 0.79 0.61 0.56 0.48 0.57
38 0.66 0.80 0.60 0.74 0.66 0.82 0.70 0.65 0.53 0.73 0.62
39 0.62 1.15 0.99 0.82 0.60 0.99 0.83 0.70 0.79 0.49 0.70
40 0.60 0.94 0.72 0.62 0.83 0.66 0.71 0.72 0.58 0.72 0.67
Min 0.43 0.60 0.39 0.47 0.39 0.45 0.57 0.40 0.24 0.37 0.48
Me-
dian 0.71 0.80 0.71 0.62 0.71 0.86 0.75 0.70 0.58 0.49 0.64
Mean 0.74 0.84 0.73 0.66 0.76 0.85 0.76 0.70 0.62 0.55 0.65
Max 1.15 1.35 1.33 1.03 1.70 1.29 1.00 0.99 1.20 1.03 0.84
St. 0.16 0.15 0.28 0.13 0.27 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.23 0.16 0.10Dev. ___ I________ __
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Table 6: Spatial Diversity Scores for Old Senate Districts
Dis- ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS P1 P1 P1 P1Dis- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Over Fac- Fac- Fac- Over
trict tor I tor 2 tor 3 tor 4 tor 5 tor 6 all tor I tor 2 tor 3 all
SES Social
Status Ur- Asian Ex- Af-i- S am-ban / - urban can- Fiscal Cu ing
His- Sub- Amer Spra Amer Age Views tural Views
panic urban ican wl ican Views
I 0.46 0.79 0.81 0.64 0.72 0.98 0.65 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.55
2 0.52 0.73 0.83 0.68 0.96 0.72 0.67 0.60 0.72 0.87 0.69
3 0.84 1.17 1.08 0.83 0.78 1.06 0.95 0.75 0.88 0.80 0.81
4 0.51 0.76 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.96 0.61 0.45 0.74 0.68 0.59
5 0.70 0.83 0.80 0.62 0.88 0.82 0.75 0.69 0.85 0.49 0.72
6 0.66 0.80 0.87 0.56 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.77 0.45 0.69
7 0.81 0.86 0.78 0.62 0.87 0.89 0.81 0.69 0.76 0.60 0.70
8 0.73 0.83 1.14 0.64 0.69 0.95 0.82 0.66 0.80 0.70 0.71
9 1.02 1.16 0.84 0.70 1.19 0.90 1.00 0.87 1.13 0.81 0.95
10 0.70 0.80 1.37 0.51 0.87 1.05 0.84 0.61 0.45 0.52 0.54
11 0.78 0.95 1.14 0.70 0.55 0.86 0.85 0.59 0.84 0.47 0.66
12 0.67 0.61 0.44 0.46 0.97 0.97 0.65 0.80 0.59 0.67 0.70
13 0.97 0.95 1.16 0.56 0.50 1.00 0.93 0.78 0.85 0.48 0.76
14 0.65 0.69 0.66 0.43 0.82 0.98 0.67 0.69 0.46 0.51 0.58
15 0.97 0.96 1.04 0.74 0.82 1.15 0.96 0.70 0.84 0.51 0.72
16 0.63 0.63 0.52 0.61 1.23 1.08 0.68 0.90 0.44 0.53 0.68
17 0.72 0.73 0.55 0.73 0.80 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.46 0.64
is 0.69 0.67 0.40 0.60 1.02 1.12 0.68 0.71 0.37 0.54 0.56
19 0.74 0.97 0.45 0.68 0.56 0.79 0.73 0.71 0.77 0.66 0.72
20 0.74 0.87 0.48 0.59 0.51 0.53 0.69 0.73 0.40 0.39 0.56
21 0.73 0.92 1.03 0.64 0.65 0.76 0.81 0.75 0.69 0.47 0.69
22 0.91 1.03 0.94 1.05 0.65 0.83 0.93 0.67 0.63 0.54 0.63
23 1.17 1.25 0.60 0.99 0.61 0.73 1.01 0.72 1.08 0.43 0.81
24 0.70 0.65 1.15 0.69 0.66 0.74 0.76 0.69 0.36 0.41 0.53
25 0.90 0.80 0.63 0.61 1.43 0.65 0.83 0.99 0.52 0.97 0.82
26 1.16 0.93 0.91 0.83 1.63 0.92 1.06 0.66 1.05 1.01 0.85
27 0.92 0.93 0.88 0.80 0.65 0.58 0.87 0.95 0.65 0.44 0.77
28 1.12 1.00 0.93 0.61 0.95 0.88 1.00 0.93 1.03 0.53 0.90
29 0.65 0.78 1.24 0.50 0.54 0.67 0.75 0.68 0.54 0.37 0.58
30 0.65 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.58 0.56 0.64 0.86 0.23 0.46 0.57
31 0.70 0.83 0.51 0.62 0.74 0.66 0.69 0.65 0.34 0.38 0.50
32 0.62 0.75 0.46 0.59 0.82 0.50 0.63 0.60 0.28 0.40 0.46
33 0.74 0.80 0.81 0.47 0.40 0.94 0.73 0.62 0.38 0.52 0.52
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34 0.61 0.60 0.95 0.78 0.62 0.84 0.69 0.68 0.30 0.38 0.50
35 0.74 0.84 1,19 0.61 0.48 1.14 0.83 0.64 0.63 0.40 0.60
36 0.53 0.80 0.75 0.60 0.66 0.83 0.65 0.61 0.53 0.76 0.60
37 0.70 0.82 0.48 0.52 0.94 1.32 0.73 0.65 0.46 0.68 0.59
38 0.80 0.79 0.59 0.73 0.60 0.85 0.75 0.58 0.66 0.54 0.60
39 0.86 1.08 1.02 0.78 0.77 0.86 0.92 0.77 1.00 0.58 0.83
40 0.76 0.84 0.66 0.64 0.88 1.05 0.78 0.78 0.67 0.86 0.75
Min 0.46 0.60 0.40 0.43 0.40 0.50 0.61 0.45 0.23 0.37 0.46
Me-
dian 0.73 0.82 0.81 0.63 0.73 0.86 0.75 0.69 0.66 0.53 0.67
Mean 0.76 0.85 0.81 0.66 0.78 0.86 0.79 0.71 0.65 0.57 0.67
Max 1.17 1.25 1.37 1.05 1.63 1.32 1.06 0.99 1.13 1.01 0.95
0.17 0.15 0.26 0.13 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.23 0.17 0.12
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Table 7: Spatial Diversity Scores for New Assembly Districts
Dis- ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS PI Pl PI PlFac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Over Fac- Fac- Fac- Over
tor 1 tor 2 tor 3 tor 4 tor 5 tor 6 all tor 1 tor 2 tor 3 all
SES .Social
Status Ur- Asian Ex- Afri- So GaalS ban / - urban can- Fiscal l ing
His- Sub- Amer Spra Amer Views tural Views
panic urban ican wI ican Views
1 0.32 0.63 0.26 0.62 0.53 0.69 0.44 0.34 0.83 0.64 0.56
2 0.44 0.68 0.37 0.78 0.58 0.75 0.54 0.40 0.83 0.52 0.57
3 0.53 0.74 0.63 0.54 0.57 0.84 0.61 0.50 0.85 0.45 0.62
4 0.70 0.83 0.68 0.65 0.71 1.05 0.74 0.53 0.91 0.60 0.68
5 0.68 0.68 0.38 0.42 0.71 1.30 0.65 0.73 0.60 0.58 0.66
6 0.40 0.74 0.49 0.51 0.43 1.13 0.54 0.34 0.33 0.48 0.36
7 0.75 0.89 0.73 0.53 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.65 0.92 0.53 0.73
8 0.51 0.85 0.72 0.54 0.56 0.69 0.63 0.53 0.47 0.35 0.48
9 0.63 0.67 0.89 0.53 0.93 0.75 0.70 0.73 0.58 0.43 0.63
10 0.79 0.68 0.35 0.78 0.45 0.66 0.67 0.39 0.78 0.72 0.58
11 0.40 0.67 0.60 0.54 0.85 0.76 0.56 0.60 0.27 0.45 0.46
12 0.44 0.54 0.49 0.35 0.62 0.66 0.49 0.62 0.28 0.50 0.48
13 0.63 0.81 0.80 0.63 0.97 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.42 0.53 0.58
14 0.76 0.92 0.86 0.70 0.92 0.62 0.80 0.70 0.59 0.40 0.62
15 1.03 1.19 0.77 0.84 1.08 0.93 1.00 0.59 1.36 0.80 0.90
16 0.44 0.85 0.88 0.55 0.50 1.05 0.65 0.38 0.45 0.51 0.43
17 0.94 1.08 1.28 0.80 0.96 1.42 1.04 0.49 1.03 0.87 0.74
18 0.92 0.95 0.87 0.60 1.20 0.81 0.90 0.62 0.87 0.45 0.69
19 0.77 0.95 1.10 0.68 0.76 0.99 0.86 0.58 0.88 0.68 0.70
20 0.75 0.80 1.30 0.53 0.75 1.07 0.85 0.63 0.38 0.45 0.51
21 0.57 0.63 0.47 0.48 0.76 0.73 0.58 0.74 0.34 0.41 0.55
22 0.76 0.80 0.89 0.56 0.53 0.78 0.75 0.58 0.56 0.41 0.55
23 0.72 0.83 0.58 0.52 0.84 0.92 0.73 0.74 0.40 0.40 0.57
24 0.90 1.01 1.10 0.80 0.61 0.91 0.93 0.67 0.78 0.41 0.67
25 0.66 0.89 1.22 0.45 0.52 1.21 0.80 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.51
26 0.73 0.52 0.33 0.46 1.04 1.30 0.66 0.77 0.40 0.45 0.59
27 0.80 0.99 1.15 0.58 0.48 0.81 0.85 0.64 0.74 0.44 0.65
28 0.56 0.93 1.23 0.51 0.57 0.76 0.75 0.43 0.37 0.33 0.39
29 0.70 0.93 0.78 0.59 0.60 0.85 0.75 0.59 0.90 0.66 0.71
30 0.86 0.68 0.40 0.44 1.02 0.99 0.73 0.80 0.50 0.52 0.65
31 0.57 0.67 0.58 0.61 1.22 1.06 0.67 0.92 0.47 0.46 0.69
32 0.74 0.55 0.44 0.63 1.17 1.10 0.70 0.96 0.34 0.58 0.68
33 0.47 0.69 0.33 0.69 0.84 0.88 0.56 0.67 0.38 0.59 0.55
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34 0.59 0.77 0.44 0.48 0.64 0.98 0.62 0.61 0.30 0.32 0.45
35 0.80 0.92 0.39 0.56 0.91 1.21 0.77 0.70 0.85 0.52 0.73
36 0.62 0.76 0.37 0.81 0.79 0.63 0.64 0.73 0.30 0.39 0.52
37 0.77 0.99 0.48 0.63 0.56 0.76 0.74 0.71 0.90 0.69 0.78
38 0.56 0.73 0.59 0.49 0.49 0.72 0.60 0.40 0.35 0.38 0.38
39 0.83 0.92 0.43 0.48 0.49 0.60 0.72 0.82 0.43 0.46 0.63
40 0.76 0.87 0.50 0.49 0.68 0.54 0.70 0.78 0.28 0.35 0.54
41 0.76 0.97 0.51 0.56 0.64 0.71 0.73 0.84 0.79 0.35 0.75
42 0.71 0.70 0.35 0.76 0.76 1.31 0.70 0.54 0.61 0.90 0.62
43 0.74 1.10 0.57 0.59 0.43 0.76 0.76 0.91 0.78 0.38 0.79
44 1.09 0.74 0.52 0.76 0.70 0.81 0.86 1.00 0.57 0.53 0.77
45 0.85 0.93 0.54 0.62 0.44 0.66 0.76 0.57 0.58 0.38 0.55
46 1.17 0.84 0.54 0.62 0.46 0.61 0.87 0.63 0.82 0.38 0.66
47 0.61 0.73 0.41 0.50 0.87 0.48 0.60 0.51 0.19 0.36 0.37
48 0.71 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.64 0.48 0.64 0.86 0.18 0.38 0.54
49 0.79 0.71 0.98 0.61 0.50 0.81 0.77 0.78 0.32 0.48 0.57
50 0.55 1.40 0.53 0.62 0.50 0.67 0.73 0.66 0.51 0.48 0.58
51 0.86 0.70 0.81 0.70 0.60 0.65 0.77 0.50 0.72 0.50 0.58
52 0.68 0.63 0.52 0.59 0.76 0.53 0.63 0.70 0.33 0.41 0.52
53 0.82 1.01 1.00 0.96 0.69 0.80 0.89 0.37 0.50 0.50 0.43
54 1.06 0.84 0.56 0.77 1.84 0.77 0.95 0.72 1.07 0.90 0.87
55 0.64 0.75 1.27 0.45 0.47 0.65 0.73 0.79 0.23 0.43 0.53
56 0.79 0.64 0.31 0.66 0.88 1.42 0.72 0.81 0.68 1.11 0.81
57 0.70 0.58 0.98 0.53 0.59 0.56 0.69 0.83 0.23 0.43 0.55
58 0.69 0.64 1.02 0.73 0.61 0.53 0.72 0.64 0.26 0.43 0.47
59 0.63 0.79 0.30 0.93 1.49 0.49 0.69 0.20 0.41 1.04 0.40
60 0.64 0.73 0.49 0.54 0.79 0.63 0.64 0.60 0.18 0.39 0.42
61 0.74 0.81 0.40 0.57 0.83 0.61 0.69 0.68 0.48 0.34 0.56
62 1.09 0.77 0.41 0.57 1.74 0.59 0.88 0.95 1.07 1.07 1.01
63 0.77 0.55 0.43 0.91 0.79 0.48 0.66 0.85 0.24 045 0.57
64 0.54 0.65 0.76 0.61 1.36 0.68 0.67 0.39 0.19 1.03 0.41
65 0.65 0.71 0.80 0.42 0.40 0.52 0.64 0.61 0.26 0.40 0.45
66 0.81 0.83 1.05 0.54 0.68 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.66 0.47 0.72
67 0.56 0.66 0.41 0.47 0.61 1.07 0.59 0.49 0.21 0.44 0.38
68 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.49 0.38 0.72 0.71 0.65 0.31 0.50 0.51
69 0.69 0.64 0.48 0.68 0.54 0.60 0.63 0.83 0.31 0.46 0.59
70 0.90 0.97 0.70 0.58 0.67 0.56 0.82 1.00 0.69 0.40 0.80
71 0.52 0.80 0.53 0.48 0.74 0.76 0.61 0.65 0.42 0.75 0.59
72 0.80 0.66 1.30 0.59 0.63 0.93 0.83 0.92 0.54 0.38 0.70
73 0.44 0.82 0.43 0.41 0.40 1.08 0.55 0.39 0.31 0.34 0.35
74 0.65 0.92 0.95 0.70 0.38 1.26 0.78 0.57 0.53 0.40 0.53
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75 0.61 0.81 0.39 0.50 0.66 0.70 0.62 0.55 0.36 0.68 0.50
76 0.77 0.71 0.35 0.90 0.69 0.77 0.70 0.52 0.75 0.46 0.59
77 0.49 0.70 1.00 0.75 0.49 1.08 0.67 0.54 0.46 0.48 0.50
78 0.73 1.05 0.78 0.87 0.52 0.85 0.81 0.67 0.80 0.48 0.69
79 0.65 0.98 0.89 0.60 0.79 0.71 0.76 0.81 0.75 0.68 0.77
80 0.63 0.99 0.56 0.53 0.66 0.54 0.68 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.57
Min 0.32 0.52 0.26 0.35 0.38 0.48 0.44 0.20 0.18 0.32 0.35
Me- 0.70 0.78 0.58 0.59 0.67 0.76 0.71 0.65 0.50 0.46 0.58dian
Mean 0.70 0.80 0.67 0.61 0.73 0.81 0.72 0.65 0.54 0.52 0.59
Max 1.17 1.40 1.30 0.96 1.84 1.42 1.04 1.00 1.36 1.11 1.01
St. 0.17 0.16 0.28 0.13 0.28 0.23 0.11 0.17 0.26 0.18 0.13
Dev. I I I I I
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Table 8: Spatial Diversity Scores for Old Assembly Districts
ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS ACS P1 P1 P1 PI
I Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Fac- Over Fac- Fac- Fac- Overtrict tor 1 tor 2 tor 3 tor 4 tor 5 tor 6 all tor 1 tor 2 tor 3 all
SES Social
Status Ur- Asian Ex- Afri-S ban / urban can- Fiscal / Gam-
His- Sub- Amer Spra Amer Age Views tural Views
panic urban ican wi ican Views
I 0.40 0.66 0.35 0.77 0.60 0.69 0.51 0.38 0.89 0.60 0.60
2 0.50 0,60 0.61 0.46 0.53 0.84 0.56 0.41 0.55 0.46 0.47
3 0.46 0.78 0.43 0.68 0.55 0.92 0.58 0.50 0.94 0.49 0.66
4 0.47 0.77 0.48 0.47 0.67 1.07 0.58 0.52 0.40 0.49 0.47
5 0.55 0.92 0.67 0.59 0.58 0.90 0.67 0.68 0.47 0.53 0.58
6 0.74 0.66 0.35 0.78 0.48 0.69 0.65 0.37 0.78 0.69 0.57
7 0.58 0.77 0.92 0.55 1.12 0.68 0.71 0.69 0.62 0.89 0.69
8 0.67 0.89 0.66 0.62 0.79 0.99 0.74 0.51 1.02 0.45 0.68
9 0.81 0.72 0.85 0.55 0.82 0.55 0.76 0.63 0.99 0.38 0.73
10 0.58 0.71 0.93 0.60 0.83 0.87 0.70 0.74 0.52 0.58 0.63
11 0.67 0.82 0.67 0.54 0.88 0.62 0.70 0.61 0.53 0.37 0.54
12 0.76 0.84 0.89 0.65 0.72 0.97 0.80 0.54 0.83 0.58 0.65
13 0.87 0.94 1.19 0.77 0.96 1.34 0.96 0.59 0.80 0.92 0.72
14 0.99 1.17 0.73 0.77 1.01 1.05 0.97 0.80 1.23 0.88 0.96
15 0.75 0.74 0.93 0.83 0.74 1.00 0.80 0.59 0.68 0.49 0.61
16 1.09 1.00 0.89 0.73 1.18 0.83 1.00 0.70 0.96 0.50 0.77
17 0.58 0.76 0.71 0.62 1.04 0.69 0.68 0.80 0.39 0.53 0.61
18 0.72 0.83 0.81 0.43 0.96 0.91 0.76 0.73 0.46 0.56 0.61
19 0.66 0.74 1.19 0.63 0.67 0.90 0.77 0.64 0.64 0.45 0.61
20 0.60 0.76 1.35 0.55 0.72 1.06 0.78 0.54 0.39 0.48 0.47
21 0.93 1.07 0.87 0.67 0.58 0.79 0.90 0.71 0.74 0.54 0.69
22 0.61 0.89 1.04 0.62 0.48 1.05 0.76 0.49 0.63 0.41 0.53
23 0.75 0.91 1.02 0.56 0.48 0.69 0.79 0.64 0.74 0.45 0.65
24 0.58 0.86 1.19 0.51 0.51 0.65 0.73 0.54 0.51 0.31 0.50
25 0.51 0.57 0.49 0.38 0.57 0.95 0.54 0.63 0.47 0.48 0.55
26 0.63 0.65 0.77 0.50 0.87 0.70 0.66 0.79 0.43 0.47 0.61
27 0.71 0.95 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.89 0.74 0.61 0.94 0.67 0.74
28 0.84 0.75 1.12 0.47 1.02 1.01 0.86 0.75 0.36 0.48 0.57
29 0.82 0.83 0.51 0.48 0.95 1.01 0.76 0.79 0.45 0.44 0.62
30 0.74 0.60 0.42 0.56 1.26 1.28 0.72 1.06 0.33 0.64 0.74
31 0.55 0.66 0.54 0.58 1.19 0.94 0.64 0.86 0.48 0.40 0.66
32 0.73 0.74 0.41 0.51 0.78 1.04 0.69 0.77 0.32 0.38 0.55
33 0.80 0.92 0.39 0.55 0.91 1.21 0.77 0.69 0.85 0.43 0.71
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34 0.68 0.57 0.33 0.66 1.13 1.19 0.66 0.68 0.41 0.55 0.56
35 0.92 0.99 0.58 0.67 0.65 0.78 0.83 0.81 0.96 0.71 0.85
36 0.54 0.74 0.36 0.66 0.79 0.67 0.59 0.71 0.38 0.40 0.55
37 0.75 0.74 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.81 0.68 0.55 0.49 0.47 0.52
38 0.63 0.73 0.58 0.54 0.49 0.72 0.63 0.58 0.33 0.40 0.46
39 0.50 0.83 0.46 0.57 0.49 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.28 0.40 0.44
40 0.79 0.90 0.46 0.58 0.47 0.52 0.71 0.66 0.41 0.37 0.53
41 1.15 1.12 0.54 0.96 0.58 0.70 0.96 0.73 1.03 0.48 0.80
42 0.54 1.14 0.57 0.61 0.35 0.68 0.68 0.49 0.44 0.37 0.46
43 0.66 0.84 0.57 0.50 0.37 0.58 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.36 0.62
44 0.81 0.84 1.09 0.60 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.60 0.34 0.68
45 0.76 0.97 0.85 0.87 0.54 0.84 0.82 0.40 0.69 0.50 0.52
46 0.69 1.03 0.64 0.90 0.63 0.70 0.77 0.29 0.45 0.51 0.38
47 1.03 0.86 0.71 0.75 1.80 0.84 0.96 0.69 1.04 0.90 0.84
48 0.66 0.88 1.05 1.07 1.65 0.82 0.88 0.28 0.57 1,19 0.52
49 0.84 0.69 1.13 0.68 0.54 0.88 0.82 0.70 0.35 0.48 0.54
50 0.52 0.52 0.26 0.70 0.67 0.45 0.50 0.58 0.19 0.45 0.42
51 0.82 0.74 0.61 0.59 1.66 0.76 0.80 0.79 0.57 0.89 0.73
52 0.42 0.54 0.25 0.64 1.10 0.46 0.49 0.34 0.22 0.91 0.38
53 0.58 0.96 1.03 0.56 0.41 0.85 0.73 0.67 0.85 0.43 0.70
54 0.91 1.13 0.75 0.62 0.68 0.57 0.87 1.05 0.59 0.38 0.78
55 0.69 0.89 0.84 0.62 1.22 0.67 0.78 0.82 0.34 0,60 0.62
56 0.67 0.62 1.10 0.70 0.53 0.51 0.71 0.59 0.24 0.31 0.43
57 0.61 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.55 0.43 0.57 0.69 0.17 0.36 0.46
58 0.69 0.66 1.01 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.70 0.85 0.23 0,40 0.56
59 0.64 0.68 0.71 0.60 0.59 0.68 0.65 0.56 0.82 0.42 0.63
60 0.63 0.63 1.30 0.46 0.47 0.72 0.71 0.59 0.26 0.47 0.45
61 0.68 0.64 0.55 0.62 0.77 0.54 0.64 0.70 0.33 0.41 0.52
62 0.58 0.79 0.41 0.54 0.82 0.47 0.60 0.47 0.19 0.36 0.35
63 0.70 0.87 0.49 0.55 0.67 0.53 0.68 0.70 0.30 0,33 0.50
64 0.79 0.82 0.44 0.61 0.79 1.07 0.74 0.69 0.48 0.57 0.60
65 0.63 0.70 0.48 0.61 0.83 1.25 0.67 0.69 0.29 0.52 0.52
66 0.68 0.65 0.39 0.62 0.66 0.70 0.62 0.62 0.26 0.64 0.49
67 0.64 0.75 0.87 0.42 0.42 0.91 0.68 0.62 0.48 0.36 0.53
68 0.74 0.70 1.25 0.59 0.55 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.52 0.37 0.62
69 0.68 0.64 082 0.74 0.61 0.74 0.70 0.81 0.35 0.46 0.59
70 0.71 0.90 0.97 0.72 0.41 1.26 0.80 0.61 0.61 0,46 0.59
71 0.80 0.72 0.68 0.52 0.70 0.80 0.73 0.71 0.34 0.49 0.55
72 0.80 0.74 0.80 0.49 0.45 0.56 0.72 0.80 0.26 0.40 0.55
73 0.69 0.83 0.42 0.95 0.66 1.02 0.72 0.68 0.56 0.31 0.58
74 0.88 0.73 0.37 0.47 0.43 0.71 0.69 0.46 0.82 0.64 0.62
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75 0.78 1.05 1.07 0.82 0.45 1.07 0.88 0.63 0.76 0.58 0.67
76 0.73 0.92 0.62 0.77 0.69 0.65 0.75 0.70 0.87 0.54 0.74
77 0.53 0.88 0.72 0.54 0.53 0.77 0.65 0.62 0.67 0.78 0.66
78 0.61 0.90 0.87 0.57 0.75 0.69 0.72 0.78 0.66 0.64 0.72
79 0.79 0.94 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.56 0.77 0.69 0.71 0.60 0.68
80 0.86 0.68 0.36 0.66 0.85 1.45 0.76 0.83 0.85 1.16 0.89
Min 0.40 0.52 0.25 0.38 0.35 0.43 0.49 0.28 0.17 0.31 0.35
Me-
dian 0.69 0.78 0.68 0.60 0.67 0.79 0.72 0.67 0.52 0.48 0.60
Mean 0.70 0.80 0.71 0.62 0.74 0.81 0.73 0.65 0.57 0.53 0.60
Max 1.15 1.17 1.35 1.07 1.80 1.45 1.00 1.06 1.23 1.19 0.96
0.15 0.15 0.28 0.13 0.29 0.22 0.11 0.15 0.25 0.18 0.12
Table 9: Regressions of Statewide Spatial Diversity Averages
Variables Model 1: All States and Model 2: All States and
Old California Districts New California Districts
Intrinsic state heterogeneity 0.702 (0.0507)*** 0.696 (0.050)***
Natural log of number of 
-0.0345 (0.00618)*** 
-0.0351 (0.00611)***
districts
Constant 0.198 (0.0316)*** 0.203 (0.0313)***
Observations 50 50
Adjusted R-Squared 0.815 0.814
Entries for variables take form: coefficient (standard error).
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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